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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 When Google undertook the seemingly insurmountable task of digitizing all the 
world’s books, it sought to create a universally searchable database that could 
potentially allow any user, anywhere in the world, to access those books. In today’s 
technological age, this is a noble goal—nearly gone are the days when people expect 
to check out hard copies of books for their research, and most journal and newspaper 
articles can be obtained electronically. Geographic availability should not constrain 
one’s ability to acquire useful information from books, and Google’s project moves 
our global information culture closer to the ideal of universally accessible electronic 
information.
 In pursuit of its goal, Google secured agreements with some of the world’s largest 
libraries, including those of Stanford University and the University of Michigan. As it 
did so, Google began indiscriminately scanning as many books as it could get its hands 
on. Regardless of whether or not books were in the public domain, had expired 
copyrights, or were currently under copyright; the book digitization process moved 
forward with full force within Google’s partner libraries through its Library Project.1
 As a result, Google ruff led more than a few feathers within the author and 
publisher community. Further exacerbating the problem was Google’s unwillingness 
to productively negotiate with the authors or publishers—according to at least one 
publishing CEO, “[t]hey had a holier-than-thou attitude that hasn’t done them any 
favors.”2 Unsurprisingly, lawsuits followed. The first lawsuit was filed against Google 
by the Authors Guild in September 2005 claiming “massive copyright infringement,” 
and, in particular, expressing concern over Google’s agreement with the University of 
Michigan to scan its library’s approximately seven million volumes.3 The publishers—
including McGraw-Hill, Pearson Education, Penguin, Simon & Schuster, and John 
Wiley & Sons—filed another infringement suit about a month later.4
 In October 2008, the authors, publishers, and Google reached a preliminary 
settlement agreement to dispose of both lawsuits (the “Settlement”).5 After the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) criticized the Settlement on both procedural due 
process and antitrust grounds, however, it was revised and an Amended Settlement 
was submitted to the court in November 2009 (the “Amended Settlement”).6 The 
1. In Google’s Library Project, Google partners with libraries to scan both public domain and in-copyright 
books. See Perspectives: What’s the Issue?, Google Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/issue.
html (last visited Aug. 2, 2010). 
2. Randall Stross, Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything 
We Know 99 (2008).
3. Class Action Complaint at 2, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/complaint/authors.pdf.
4. Stross, supra note 2, at 100.
5. Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 
2008) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement], available at http://thepublicindex.org/documents.responses.
6. Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Amended Settlement Agreement], available at http://thepublicindex.org/
docs/amended_settlement/Amended-Settlement-Agreement.pdf; Statement of Interest of the United 
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Settlement seeks to balance the private interests of authors and publishers with the 
public interest. The Settlement serves the public interest—and, indeed, can be 
construed as pro-competitive—to the extent that it expands public accessibility of 
digitized books that had not previously existed in digital form.7 The Settlement also 
gives authors and publishers continued incentives to produce books by providing 
them with their deserved slices of the revenue pie when such books are digitized. 
While these public interests may be served by the Settlement to some degree, 
however, the Settlement continues to raise long-term anti-competitive concerns. 
Google’s spokesman has made claims to the contrary, arguing that “[t]he [Settlement] 
[A]greement was structured in a way specifically to encourage competition.”8 Allan 
Adler, the vice president for legal and government affairs for the Association of 
American Publishers (AAP), has made similar arguments, stating that antitrust 
objections to the Settlement will subside once “the confusion” about the Settlement 
is clarified.9 Yet, at least initially, neither Google nor the AAP provided thorough 
justifications explaining why the Settlement is pro-competitive.10 And, no matter 
how pro-competitive the Settlement is alleged to be by Google and others,11 the 
Settlement can be vastly improved to further promote competition.
 This article discusses four antitrust concerns that arise from the Settlement. The 
first concern—which is per se illegal under the Sherman Act—is the horizontal 
States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 
05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Statement], available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/cases/fa250100/250180.pdf. Please note that, I refer to both the original settlement 
(“Settlement”) and the Amended Settlement. In light of the changes to the Settlement, I use these 
terms interchangeably. When I use the term Amended Settlement, however, I do so to emphasize 
changes made to the original Settlement document.
7. Supporters of the Settlement Agreement, such as Einer Elhauge, argue that it is pro-competitive 
because it expands output for both out-of-copyright and in-copyright books (both claimed and 
unclaimed). See Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive (Harvard Law Sch. 
John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Business Discussion Paper Series No. 646, 2009), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/629. 
8. Juan Carlos Perez, Google Pushes Back in Tussle Over Book Search Settlement, PCWorld (Apr. 29, 2009), 
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,164094/printable.html.
9. Id. 
10. Cf. Adam Smith, Google Book Search Settlement Will Expand Access, Google Pub. Policy Blog (Apr. 29, 
2009, 10:30 AM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/04/google-book-search-settlement-
will.html (arguing that the Google Book Search settlement will expand access to books and questions 
about the settlement will be addressed at a later date). Shortly before the Settlement fairness hearing, 
Google filed a brief with the court explaining why it believes that the settlement is pro-competitive. See 
Brief of Google, Inc. In Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at 
28–51, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
Google Brief]. Most of these arguments track the arguments made by Professor Einer Elhauge of 
Harvard. See Elhauge, supra note 7. 
11. For example, both Google and Elhauge argue that the settlement expands output, and, but for the 
settlement, many digital books would be unavailable to consumers. See Google Brief, supra note 10; 
Elhauge, supra note 7.
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price-fixing12 of orphan works13 that will be authorized by the Settlement. Second, 
the institutional subscription arrangement in the Settlement leaves the door open to 
predatory pricing schemes that create anti-competitive reliance interests.14 Third, the 
Settlement could exacerbate collective action problems faced by Google’s potential 
competitors in the digitized book market, strengthening Google’s monopoly position 
once the Settlement is formally approved. Finally, to the extent that the Google 
Book Search product can be integrated with other pre-existing Google features under 
the Settlement, it promotes anti-competitive tying15 that unjustly improves Google’s 
monopoly position.16
 The antitrust analysis in this article is conducted from a risk-averse perspective—
the antitrust issues presented here pose different levels of concern, and some take 
priority over others. Although legal scholars have addressed some of these antitrust 
concerns,17 the overall scope of all of these antitrust risks has not been thoroughly 
discussed in a single examination. Additionally, this article explicitly presents a series 
of public interest principles that should guide the court and the DOJ as they work 
with Google, the Authors Guild, and the AAP in approving a final agreement. I 
argue that a rule of reason inquiry based on economic efficiency can and should be 
12. Horizontal price-fixing is defined as a conspiracy among a group of suppliers to agree on the prices that 
they charge. See Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics 173 (2d ed. 2009).
13. See U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 1 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.
gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. These works are sometimes referred to as unclaimed books, as these are 
books under copyright that have not been claimed by the copyright owner. Id.
14. Predatory pricing schemes, as discussed in this context, are efforts in which low prices are charged 
initially to ensure that a firm may charge large monopoly prices later on as a result of a substantial 
lessening of competition. See, e.g., Blair & Kaserman, supra note 12, at 160 (discussing how the 
invalidity of predatory pricing schemes hinges on the possibility of recouping losses after initially 
charging a low price to entice consumers).
15. “A tying arrangement exists when a seller of one product, A, requires its customers to purchase from it a 
second product, B, as well.” Id. at 391. In Part IV.D, I argue that Google has used Google Web Search 
as a tying product to promote Google Book Search as a tied product.
16. See infra Part IV.D. Throughout this article, I will refer to Google Book Search by its full name and 
“GBS” interchangeably. Google Book Search, for example, is tied to Google Web Search. I contend that 
Google Book Search should not be able to attain a superior market position by sheer virtue of its 
connection to Google Web Search. Although Google indisputably earned its strong market position in 
the competitive search industry, this should not excessively limit potential competitors’ ability to 
compete in book search. Google’s ability to rank and control search results may have an impact on this 
competitive ability.
17. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, How To Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 J. Internet L. 1, 1 
(Apr. 2009) (addressing antitrust concerns about the settlement’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause 
and the possibility of cartel-like price-fixing); Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A 
New Orphan-Works Monopoly? (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 462, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1387582 (discussing the orphan-works 
monopoly problem, the MFN clause, and antitrust immunity); Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The 
Dead Souls of the Google Booksearch Settlement, O’Reilly Radar (Apr. 17, 2009, 1:35 AM), http://radar.
oreilly.com/print/35891.html (highlighting monopoly concerns and the orphan works problem).
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guided by these principles to some extent.18 Finally, I argue that the discussion of the 
antitrust issues of the Settlement should largely be framed in terms of a market for 
fully searchable, digitized books. Others, including Google, have failed to frame the 
market in this manner.19 Yet it is important that awareness of these antitrust concerns 
continues to increase. The opt-out period for the lawsuit has already ended.20 The 
fairness hearing has already occurred,21 and approval of the Settlement is likely.22 
While the DOJ has been engaged in an inquiry of the Settlement since April 
200923—and has already issued statements expressing its concerns with both the 
original Settlement and the Amended Settlement24—it has yet to complete this 
inquiry and may discover additional antitrust problems as time progresses.25
 This article therefore encourages continued DOJ oversight of the Settlement—
both prior to and after its approval—so that it may be tailored and modified as 
necessary to represent the public interest as well as the interests of third parties who 
may wish to partake in book digitization moving forward. Although I speculate on 
the nature of the digital book market, the market for these books is still evolving, 
and so will a vision for what ideal competition should look like in that market.
 A major theme of this article is that, when such significant public interests are 
implicated, the DOJ should assert its oversight authority in addressing any potential 
concerns of the Settlement. In his recent article arguing for a well-defined public 
interest standard in the regulation of broadband internet technology, Anthony Varona 
notes that “[t]he role of government in relation to the Internet now is largely a reactive 
18. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement at 
28, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
Open Book Alliance Memorandum] (citing In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP 
Litigation, 957 F.2d 1020, 1025–26 (2d Cir. 1992)), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/
amended_settlement/Open_Book_Alliance.pdf. 
19. See Google Brief, supra note 10, at 31–32 (implying that unclaimed, “orphan books” may not have 
significant value to consumers to the extent that they are out of print today). The real value to these out 
of print books, I argue, is their searchability and utility for consumptive research purposes; thus the fact 
that these books are out of print and individuals fail to purchase full copies of these books is irrelevant 
to the market competition inquiry.
20. The opt-out period for the Amended Settlement expired on January 28, 2010. Order Granting 
Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at 5, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009).
21. The fairness hearing occurred on February 18, 2010. Transcript of Fairness Hearing, Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Transcript of Fairness 
Hearing], available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/case_order/fairness-hearing-transcript.pdf. 
22. Such hearings usually focus primarily on a settlement’s impact on the direct parties involved in the 
litigation, not on the broader consumers that may be affected by such settlements. See Picker, supra note 
17, at 4–5.
23. See Miguel Helft, Justice Department Opens Antitrust Inquiry Into Google Books Deal, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/technology/internet/29google.html.
24. See DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 16.
25. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 21, at 128 (stating that the antitrust investigation is 
ongoing).
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one,” and that the federal government has maintained “a nonregulatory orientation 
toward the internet.”26 Similarly, a lack of proactive intervention on the front-end 
forced reactive regulation during the BMI and ASCAP licensing controversies. This 
deferential, wait-and-see approach should not be taken in relation to a settlement of 
this importance. The Settlement’s failure to reduce barriers to entry should be as big 
of a concern as an affirmative creation of those barriers to entry.
 If the DOJ fails to thoroughly and continually address the antitrust implications 
of the Settlement Agreement, public accessibility to digital books will be limited, 
innovative digital book solutions will be stunted, and the public will not have an 
adequate stake in the future of digital books. Meanwhile, Google will be able to 
maintain a relative monopoly in a market for fully searchable, digitized books with 
minimal threat to its market position. Google will be able to fix prices and be 
profitable, create its own innovative solutions for its platform to the possible exclusion 
of interested third party vendors’ innovations, and integrate Google Book Search 
into its other services (such as Google Web Search) in a manner that stif les 
competition. Given the seriousness of these risks, corrective regulation would be 
wasteful when there is an opportunity to correct potential legal harms before the 
full-scale implementation of the Settlement Agreement by modifying its terms. The 
expected costs of the Settlement—the potential future costs of antitrust problems 
multiplied by the likelihood of these problems occurring—are greater than the 
expected benefits of the Settlement in its current form.
 This article proceeds in the following manner. Part II presents normative public 
interest principles. These principles are meant to guide the analysis in the rest of the 
article, and I discuss why these principles should be considered as the DOJ continues 
to pursue its antitrust inquiry. Part III then proposes a possible definition of the 
market for digitized books. Interestingly, no other discussion of this Settlement has 
attempted to define the relatively new market that Google is about to enter, and a 
market definition is crucial to any antitrust inquiry under the rule of reason because, 
depending on one’s framing of market definition, antitrust suspicions may vary 
substantially. Part IV then discusses each of the four antitrust concerns in further 
depth. Part V provides additional reasons—both doctrinal and normative—why the 
Settlement remains unreasonable and potentially anti-competitive in its current form. 
Part VI concludes by arguing that continued oversight and scrutiny of the Settlement 
will be necessary to promote access to knowledge, competition, and innovation in the 
emerging digital book market.
ii. thE pUbLiC intErEst prinCipLEs at staKE
 This discussion outlines the normative public interest principles that should 
govern analysis of the Google Book Search Settlement. A settlement agreement 
rarely affects the future of such large amounts of information and, if we fail to strictly 
scrutinize its implications early on, there is a risk that we will have to go back and 
repair a damaged system. While many of the antitrust concerns I discuss are 
26. Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2009).
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problematic independent of these public interest principles, it is crucial that the DOJ 
understands exactly what is at stake. The DOJ signaled the importance of public 
interest principles in its initial filing, up to and including the principle that any 
settlement modifications should promote broad access to knowledge.27 An anti-
competitive market for digitized books has the potential to undermine each of these 
principles, which now follow.
 A. Information Should be Broadly Accessible
 Given that virtually every person in the United States is able to check out and use 
hard copy books for free within public libraries, we operate in a society that is highly 
principled in providing access to knowledge. However, traditional print libraries do 
not adequately disseminate knowledge to all parts of the United States—some 
citizens live near libraries that have very minimal print resources, while others live 
near libraries that have hundreds of thousands—possibly millions—of volumes. 
Meanwhile, some may live substantially further from their libraries than others, or 
have disabilities that make it difficult for them to physically travel to a library.
 We should view digitized books as a remedy for this unequal access to knowledge. 
And, although the Settlement will allow both people with disabilities and people 
who live in rural areas broader access to library materials than they have under the 
current system, it could do better.28 Provisions are already in the Settlement to 
increase access to the disabled,29 but the Settlement can do much better to facilitate 
access in rural regions. Remote access to the database through public libraries, for 
example, could be an invaluable resource to library patrons who may have a difficult 
time going to libraries in person. Yet, absent approval by Google and the Settlement-
created Book Rights Registry,30 public libraries, government, and K–12 schools will 
27. See, e.g., DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 2 (“As a threshold matter, the central difficulty that the Proposed 
Settlement seeks to overcome—the inaccessibility of many works due to the lack of clarity about copyright 
ownership and copyright status—is a matter of public, not merely private, concern.”). In addition,
Google has made clear in the past that it started this project on the premise that anyone, 
anywhere, anytime, should have the tools to explore the great works of history and 
culture. However the Proposed Settlement is modified by the parties, this approach 
should continue to be at its heart.
 Id. at 26.
28. Cf. id.
In the Proposed Settlement, Google has committed to providing accessible formats and 
comparable user experience to individuals with print disabilities—and if these goals are 
not realized within five years of the agreement, Google will be required to locate an 
alternative provider who can accomplish these accommodations. Along with many in 
the disability community, the United States strongly supports such provisions.
 Id.
29. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, §§ 1.114, 3.3(d), 7.2(b)(ii).
30. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, art. VI. The Book Rights Registry will be discussed throughout 
this paper. The Registry is a distinct entity from Google created by the settlement that is responsible for 
collecting the revenues that are to be distributed to authors and publishers per terms of the settlement. 
The Registry will have a board of directors comprised of representatives of both the authors and 
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be denied from gaining remote access31 to the GBS database—even if such public 
institutions were willing to pay for it.32 Further, although the Settlement provides for 
a free public access service to the GBS database for public libraries, it only authorizes 
one free terminal per building.33 Thus, from a practical standpoint, authentic public 
access to the GBS service would require libraries to purchase additional seat licenses.34 
If public libraries wanted to provide additional terminals, however, the level of 
accessibility would hinge on the institutional pricing structures that are faced by 
these institutions.
 The public’s interests in affordability and accessibility are best served by a 
competitive market. As noted by the government, “Google has made clear in the past 
that it started this project on the premise that anyone, anywhere, anytime should 
have the tools to explore the great works of history and culture.”35 If it truly stands by 
that principle, public institutions should not be priced out of the market, nor should 
they receive access to “disabled” versions of the GBS database.36 In addition, the 
Settlement should not make it unfairly difficult for potential competitors to offer less 
expensive digitized books to public institutions than Google. Finally, the Settlement 
could be expanded to provide default public access to other entities, such as K–12 
schools, that would greatly benefit from digital book accessibility.37 Under the current 
settlement these schools do not even receive the single terminal that the public 
libraries get.
publishers, and it will have substantial power to make significant decisions relating to pricing and 
licensing of digitized books. The Registry is defined and discussed in Article VI of the Settlement. Id.
31. Remote access could be conferred, for example, through the use of virtual private networking. 
32. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.1(a)(iv)(3)–(5).
33. Id. § 4.8(a)(i)(3). The Amended Settlement, however, does allow for the possibility of more than one 
terminal to be authorized within public libraries. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, 
§ 4.8(a)(i)(3). (“[T]he Registry may authorize one or more additional terminals in any Library Building 
under such further conditions at [sic] may establish, acting in its sole discretion and in furtherance of 
the interests of all rightsholders.”).
34. If the settlement allowed for additional seat licenses, libraries could have additional terminals within 
the library where users could access the Google Book Search database. If only one “public access” seat 
license is provided, libraries would need to purchase additional seat licenses to increase accessibility.
35. DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 26.
36. In a conversation with Frank Pasquale, Schering-Plough Professor in Healthcare Regulation and 
Enforcement at Seton Hall Law School and Visiting Professor of Law at Yale Law School, he noted that 
the Seton Hall Law Library has had to reduce its subscriptions to electronic services such as LexisNexis 
and Westlaw, and that smaller law schools may be forced into purchasing “disabled” versions of research 
databases that are of inferior quality to the standard offerings. 
37. This may not be viewed as a problem the Settlement should solve. However, to the extent that the 
Settlement will raise barriers to entry into the digital book market (as I argue), this is a niche area of the 
market that may have been covered by digital book providers absent the Settlement. If we adhere to 
broad consumer and knowledge accessibility principles in our analysis of the Settlement, the competitive 
market we envision should provide access within these market segments. 
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 B. The Public is Entitled to Highly-Innovative Book Digitization Solutions
 Google has undertaken significant efforts in producing its digital book database; 
to the extent that Google has independently generated its own innovative solution, it 
should be entitled to its share of the market.38 The Settlement should not, however, 
preclude or stif le potential innovations in the book digitization market. To the extent 
that the Settlement promotes monopolistic behavior and limits competition, it may 
stunt certain niche innovations and value-added services. While Google has created 
an innovative book-scanning method, for example, we cannot be sure that Google’s 
optical character recognition (OCR) would produce more accurate texts than the 
next scanning innovation.39 Furthermore, while the Google Search algorithms may 
be superior for web or other internet-based searches, they may not be superior for 
book searches and other companies may be in a better position to provide these 
resources. Finally, third parties may be able to provide digital book translation 
services more efficiently. While the Settlement will not preclude these innovations 
from being created, a large Google monopoly may provide disincentives for innovators 
to integrate their technologies into a digitized book search platform. In particular, if 
the Settlement codifies an unreasonable first mover advantage for Google, there may 
be significant barriers to entry that prevent competitors from providing these 
innovations. In this world, the market may be forced to settle for subpar scans, 
suboptimal search results, or poorly translated works.
 Although the Settlement contemplates a “research corpus” of digitized books 
that can be used for non-consumptive research,40 both Google and the Book Rights 
Registry have the power to restrict for-profit entities from undertaking this type of 
research using the research corpus.41 Whether or not Google should be forced to 
expand rights to research on the corpus is debatable. One can imagine, however, a 
scenario in which Google would be willing to provide a slightly inferior language 
translation service to customers to the exclusion of another translation service that 
would have been created through research on the corpus, but for Google’s restrictions. 
Google may do this because it is interested in bolstering its innovative reputation in 
38. But see Open Book Alliance Memorandum, supra note 18 (arguing that Google did not obtain its current 
market position entirely via its strong business acumen or innovative prowess, but rather by 
misrepresenting its true intentions in a manner that allowed it to obtain a head start in the book 
digitization market).
39. See Maureen Clements, The Secret of Google’s Book Scanning Machine Revealed, NPR (Apr. 30, 2009, 
10:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/library/2009/04/the_granting_of_patent_7508978.
html?sc=fb&cc=fp.
40. Non-consumptive research is research that does not use the substantive content of scanned books in the 
GBS database to make research findings. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 1.90. For example, 
researchers could use the GBS database to perform research on translation, indexing, and search 
functionality without drawing any conclusions based on the substantive content of the scanned text. 
The scanned texts are merely used to optimize the non-consumptive functionality of the GBS database. 
Consumptive research, on the other hand, would involve the explicit use of the substantive content of 
scanned books to draw conclusions. For example, one may want to use the content of scanned books 
discussing Abraham Lincoln to write a biographical report on him.
41. See id. § 1.121.
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the book search market. By preventing competitors from producing niche innovations 
to the book search platform, Google could create the false impression that it is the 
better innovator in the book search field than it actually is, thus further improving 
its monopoly position. If Google had driven prior innovations in the book search 
market, some may argue that Google may be entitled to that power.42 Google is not 
entitled, however, to a settlement that stif les competition so much so that third 
parties are significantly limited in their abilities to produce profitable innovations 
that could benefit the public, the authors, and the publishers.43
 C. The Public’s Role in Shaping the Future of Digital Information
 The terms of the Settlement will set the stage for the ways in which the public 
will be able to access digital books. Given that Google will be the primary provider 
of digitized books when the Settlement is approved, Google and the Book Rights 
Registry will—at least initially—have extensive authority over how the information 
in digitized books is distributed and priced. Meanwhile, because of the probable lack 
of competition in the digitized book market after the Settlement’s effective date, 
consumers will have little ability to express their preferences through the market. 
Thus, assuming that few entities are in the market for digitized books, the public 
should have some say in how digitized books are distributed and priced—either 
through the Book Rights Registry or some other institution. Because the Settlement 
also contemplates the censorship of certain books within the database, the public 
should understand how the Settlement may limit their ability to access certain 
digitized books. Therefore, the public should have a stake in efforts to find digital 
book providers for those works. If the anti-competitive effects of the Settlement 
Agreement are substantially reduced, however, institutional measures will be less 
necessary, because a settlement agreement that promotes free competition from the 
outset may require less long-term regulation.
iii. a MarKEt fOr fULLY sEarChabLE, digitiZEd bOOKs
 Before applying these three principles to an antitrust analysis, however, it is 
important to define the relevant market in which Google Book Search operates. To 
commit an antitrust violation, a defendant must possess a dominant share of the 
42. One possible counter-argument is that due to the initial risk Google took in creating the GBS database 
and the corresponding gains in efficiency that have resulted from its success, some future efficiency 
losses may be acceptable.
43. A Google monopoly could create dynamic incentives for larger companies to try to obtain the entire 
book digitization and search markets, but to the extent that such a market relies on the licensing of the 
entire corpus of digitized books (including orphan works), the Settlement will not provide opportunities 
to license the full store of books that Google will be offering. Some, such as Einer Elhauge, argue that 
a competitor could always seek the class action mechanism to obtain a similar deal. See Elhauge, supra 
note 7. But this would not only be an inefficient way to obtain a pro-competitive outcome, it would also 
validate Google’s, the Authors’, and the Publishers’ failure to admit that they were contemplating a 
business deal that would open up millions of copyrighted works to digitization. See DOJ Statement, 
supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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relevant market and it must be shown that there are significant barriers to entry into 
that market.44 As I discuss in forthcoming sections, Google currently has a dominant 
share of the relevant market and the Settlement will only reinforce that share. Before 
that analysis is possible, however, the relevant market must be defined. This Part 
argues that the relevant market should be defined as the market for fully searchable, 
digitized books. I argue that Google currently has few, if any, competitors in this 
distinct market,45 but that a number of companies have the ability to enter this market 
in the coming years.
 A. Defining Google Book Search Products
 The instrumental point in constructing a definition of the relevant market is that 
“the relevant market should not be a set of products, which ‘resemble’ each other on 
the basis of some characteristics but rather the set of products . . . that exercise some 
competitive constraint on each other.”46 Products that exercise competitive constraints 
on one another, for all intents and purposes, are products that are viewed by consumers 
as substitutes for one another. Thus, to the extent that we can find products that are 
substitutes for Google’s offerings of digital books within its book search platform, 
the market is so defined. However, this substitutability is not purely determined by 
consumers from the demand side of the market.47 Competitors that do not currently 
offer a substitutable product may nevertheless have the ability to compete in the 
market if they possess the supply-side ability to switch production rapidly.48 Judge 
Posner has discussed the importance of the substitutability analysis in market 
definitions, and has criticized the DOJ for its failure to consider substitutes in 
production in its guidelines for determining market definitions.49
 It is important to distinguish between the different “products” that are implicated 
within the GBS Settlement. Consumers can exercise three distinct levels of 
purchasing power when they use GBS. At the lowest level (search), consumers 
perform a search using GBS to obtain book results that are relevant to various 
searches or queries. Although consumers do not directly pay money for these search 
queries, they effectively purchase these searches by supporting the advertisers who 
44. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
45. The closest competitor at this time (based on my market definition) is the Open Content Alliance’s 
(OCA) Internet Archive. However, the Internet Archive does not provide full-text searchability of its 
digitized books. The OCA is also not a for-profit competitor of Google, and it does not digitize 
copyrighted works itself, instead is provides a space, the Internet Archive, where contributed digitized 
materials are stored. See About: What is Open Content Alliance?, Open Content Alliance, http://www.
opencontentalliance.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010); Internet Archive, http://www.archive.
org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
46. Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 102 (2004).
47. Id. at 103.
48. Id. 
49. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 131–32 (1976).
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pay Google to be featured in a “sponsored links” section on the right side of the book 
search results page.50 At the next level (single purchase), individual consumers can 
purchase the rights to unfettered access to individual digital copies of books using 
the consumer purchase option.51 Finally, institutions can purchase access to broader 
collections of digitized books through an institutional purchase option (institutional 
subscriptions).52
 The unifying theme of these three purchasing options is that they result from 
Google’s ability to provide books that are not only digitized, but also searchable. The 
value Google is providing is via (1) its creation of a large digitized book universe that 
previously did not exist, and (2) broad search functionality within this universe. 
Google is thus providing consumers with fully searchable, digitized versions of 
books. Although the GBS platform will likely improve readership of books through 
full-text downloads and print on demand options,53 the primary benefit of this 
functionality is that it will allow its consumers to perform consumptive research—
both for academic and personal purposes—using books.54
 B. Potential Substitutes for Google Book Search Products: A Demand Side Analysis
 There are currently no direct substitutes for fully searchable, digitized books on 
the demand side of the market. The demand side of the market is comprised of 
products that are currently available for consumers to purchase. There are at least 
two reasons that current offerings are not effective substitutes for GBS products. 
First, printed books are only a substitute for GBS products to the extent that 
consumers can productively use Google’s consumer purchase option to read the full 
texts of books. It is doubtful that full-text readability will be the primary motivation 
for consumers to purchase digitized books as, under the Settlement, consumers who 
purchase books are not able to print out the full texts of books with a single print 
command.55 In addition, although contemplated, the initial rollout of GBS will not 
allow for full PDF downloads of copyrighted books.56 Thus, off line access to full-
text copies of these books may not be possible. Admittedly, some may want to read 
the full-text of books online, but I would not predict that this will be a primary use 
50. For example, this occurs when a customer clicks through to Amazon.com to purchase a full-text version 
of a book. Note that the click to Amazon.com from the Google Book Search functions in the market for 
fully searchable, digitized books. The purchase of the full-text book functions in the market for printed 
books, which is a distinct market.
51. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.2(a).
52. Id. §§ 1.74, 4.1(a)(i).
53. To the extent that the relevant market is a market for readers of entire book texts. 
54. Note the distinction from non-consumptive research, discussed earlier, which is not concerned with an 
understanding of the substantive subject-matter content of books. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
55. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.2(a) (“[U]ser will not be able to select a page range that is 
greater than twenty (20) pages with one print command for printing.”).
56. The option for file downloads of PDF books is an “additional revenue model” that may be agreed to by 
Google and the Registry. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.7(b).
187
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
of GBS.57 Print books, therefore, serve distinct purposes and are not very strong 
substitutes for GBS.
 The second reason that printed books are not perfect substitutes for Google 
Books is more obvious—printed books almost completely lack search functionality. 
Although some printed books are indexed, most printed books are extremely difficult 
to search manually. When scholars use GBS for consumptive research purposes, they 
are looking for specific information on a topic of interest. Once they locate the 
needed information, it is somewhat realistic to predict that they will then go ahead 
and purchase the printed version of the book. This may once again lead one to believe 
that printed books could be construed as substitutes for GBS. However, this only 
illustrates that, in these cases, a search on Google Book Search is a precondition for 
the purchase of the printed books. When a consumer searches for a given book and 
proceeds to purchase that book from a sponsored retailer, the consumer is still 
“purchasing” a Google Book Search product (the “search” product).58 In the case of 
substitute goods, purchase of one of the goods necessarily leads to non-purchase of 
the other good. Although some degree of competition can be inferred in these 
instances (to the extent that someone may be induced to purchase a printed book via 
a book search instead of a digital book through the consumer purchase option), 
Google is able to maintain its market dominance in the market for fully searchable, 
digitized books whether or not printed books are purchased subsequently.
 The publishers of printed books, meanwhile, would not be considered strong 
competitors on the supply side of the equation primarily because they lack the ability 
to develop search algorithms. In addition, they have entered into this licensing 
agreement with Google, indicating that they do not deem the digitization of books 
to be an efficient undertaking from their standpoint. The publishers of these printed 
books lack the capability to develop search algorithms—this is why they were willing 
to vertically integrate with Google in the first place. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude 
that printed books should not be included in a market definition for GBS products.
 C. Potential Substitutes for Google Books Search Products: A Supply Side Analysis
 The supply side of the market is comprised of those producers in the marketplace 
who, while not producing the equivalent of GBS products right now, may have the 
production capacity to create analogous products in the future. From this side of the 
57. This is more likely the case for digital, as opposed to digitized, books, which are stored on devices such 
as the Kindle or the Android. The market for readership of full-text readable books is distinguished 
from this analysis of a market for fully searchable, digitized books. Given current market conditions, I 
would argue that the market for full-text readable books is far more competitive. See, e.g., infra note 59 
and accompanying text.
58. I must make one caveat here. One may infer pure substitutability where a user searches using GBS, 
locates a book, and then runs to the bookstore to purchase the printed book. Nevertheless, as previously 
discussed, every search on GBS supports Google’s profitability to some extent. See supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. Usage rates of the GBS services are likely to play a role in Google’s advertising 
revenue, which means bare GBS searches themselves are a form of purchasing power on the “search” 
level of purchasing power. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
188
coNTiNUeD DoJ overSiGhT oF The GooGLe Book Search SeTTLeMeNT
market, the substitutability question becomes more difficult when we consider whether 
products like Amazon’s Kindle and Sony’s eReader should be included in the market 
definition.59 The Kindle offers digitized books on a portable hardware platform.60 Its 
purpose is primarily to enable its consumers to read books on a portable electronic 
device. Consumers can realize the benefits of storing several books on one small 
hardware device rather than face the burden of carrying several printed books. And, 
although the Kindle is searchable, consumers have to purchase and download books to 
their Kindle before they can search that book’s full-text, whereas with GBS one can 
always search the full-text of all books in the GBS corpus regardless of past book 
purchases. Therefore, even though these books are presented in a digital form, the 
Kindle is not a strong substitute for the GBS product in its current form because it does 
not afford consumers with the broad consumptive research functionality of GBS.
 A supply-side analysis of these products, however, indicates that Amazon, Sony, 
and other providers of digital book products could be viable competitors in a GBS 
digital book market in the future—i.e., a market for fully searchable, digitized books. 
Another viable competitor in this market may soon be Apple, which has recently 
launched its new iPad.61 Amazon is familiar with the basic tenets of search 
technology—it currently provides a searchable full-text database of some of its books 
on its website through its “Search Inside the Book” feature62—and could easily 
integrate such features into the Kindle or other products. If Amazon were to 
undertake initiatives to improve its search technology and digitize more books, it 
could be an entrant to the GBS market—but it can only be a viable entrant to this 
market if it is able to achieve broad copyright licenses to digitize books.63 For these 
reasons, among others, Amazon filed a brief expressing its continuing concerns that 
the Settlement is anti-competitive.64
 Other competitors on the supply side of the market for fully searchable, digitized 
books include current journal publishers and legal book publishers such as Westlaw 
and LexisNexis. Although these groups do not currently have a store of mainstream 
59. The Amazon Kindle and Sony eReader are both portable reading devices that allow one to download and 
display full texts of books on an electronic platform. See Kindle Store, Amazon, http://www.amazon.com/
dp/B002Y27P3M/?tag=googhydr-20&hvadid=6105831667&ref=pd_sl_c3c2rm11h_b (last visited Oct. 
11, 2010); see Reader, ReaderStore, http://ebookstore.sony.com/reader/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
60. See Amazon, supra note 59. 
61. See Ben Elowitz, The Top Ten Reasons the Apple iPad Will Put the Amazon Kindle Out of Business, 
Washington Post, Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/28/
AR2010012802947.html.
62. Search Inside the Book, Amazon, http://www.amazon.com/Search-Inside-Book-Books/b?ie=UTF8& 
node=10197021 (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
63. To be a viable competitor in the consumptive research market (the market for fully searchable, digitized 
books), however, one must have a broad range of searchable materials. Thus, the degree of competitive 
constraints that Amazon, Sony, and other possible competitors may place on Google is limited by 
copyright licensing restrictions.
64. Objection of Amazon.com, Inc. to Proposed Amended Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Amazon Objection], available at http://
thepublicindex.org/docs/amended_settlement/amazon.pdf.
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digital books, they do have the capacity to digitize (e.g., Westlaw scans and digitizes 
Federal and State Reporters, and journal companies create full text scans of their 
articles). Moreover, Westlaw and LexisNexis have been in the search business for a 
long time—they have developed search algorithms for consumptive research that, 
arguably, may be superior to Google’s search algorithm.65 Consequently, these 
companies are foreseeable entrants into the market for GBS.
 Finally, search companies like Yahoo and Microsoft are potential entrants into 
this market. Their relevance to the GBS market is similar to Westlaw’s and 
LexisNexis’s relevance in that these companies have also created search algorithms 
(i.e., through the creation of internet search engines, and could potentially begin 
their own initiatives to scan and digitize books). Microsoft, in fact, has already 
attempted a book digitization project, but this project has since been suspended 
because (1) it, unlike Google, did not choose to risk lawsuits through unauthorized 
scans of in-copyright books and (2) it chose to refocus its efforts on pursuits it 
considered to be more profitable.66 Nevertheless, Microsoft could still be a relevant 
player in the GBS market.
 Libraries themselves are foreseeable competitors to GBS as well. Librarians have 
a unique understanding of indexing and searching within the library context; they 
are the ones who design the searchable card catalogs that help us locate printed 
books of relevance in our libraries. And, notwithstanding the fact that most libraries 
lack the technological infrastructure to digitally scan books on a large scale, these 
entities are in the best position to create these scans because they already have 
physical copies of books at their disposal.67
 From this analysis, the appropriate market definition for GBS is a market for 
fully searchable, digitized books. In their current form, books are generally used for 
two purposes—casual reading and consumptive research. In the past, consumptive 
research was limited by the capacity of indexed card catalogs and library databases: 
never before has an entity managed to digitize the full texts of books while providing 
search functionality in such a large, comprehensive database. Although some 
consumers may use GBS for casual reading, I predict that the vast majority of 
consumers will use GBS for consumptive research. To the extent that GBS is used as 
a research tool, current products will not impose competitive constraints on GBS. 
Google, by virtue of its pre-settlement adoption of the Google Books corpus, already 
65. In the consumptive research context, Westlaw and LexisNexis may have superior search algorithms, for 
example, because their products allow one to search using more specialized connectors (for example, 
searching for terms that occur within X words of one another).
66. See Andrea L. Foster, Microsoft’s Book-Search Project Has a Surprise Ending, The Chronicle of Higher 
Educ. (June 6, 2008), http://chronicle.com/article/Microsoft-s-Book-Search/2820; Satya Nadella, Book 
Search Winding Down, Bing Blog (May 23, 2008, 2:45 AM), http://www.bing.com/toolbox/blogs/
search/archive/2008/05/23/book-search-winding-down.aspx. 
67. Libraries could, for example, obtain scanners from the DIY book scanner project. See Priya Ganapati, 
DIY Book Scanners Turn Your Books Into Bytes, Wired: Gadget Lab Blog (Dec. 11 2009, 7:42 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/12/diy-book-scanner/. 
190
coNTiNUeD DoJ overSiGhT oF The GooGLe Book Search SeTTLeMeNT
has a significant share of this market, and not the 0% share that it currently asserts.68 
Given that several potential competitors to Google could enter this market in the 
coming years, we must scrutinize the Settlement’s ability to foreclose competition 
and prevent entry by these competitors.
iV. OVErViEW Of thE sEttLEMEnt’s anti-COMpEtitiVE EffECts
 In addressing the considerations made by the DOJ when choosing whether to 
intervene in a particular licensing agreement, I consulted the Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the “Guidelines”), which was jointly issued by the 
FTC and the DOJ in April, 1995.69 While these Guidelines do not have the binding 
force of law, the agencies are unlikely to challenge a license agreement that complies 
with them, and courts often cite the Guidelines as persuasive authority on the antitrust 
legality of intellectual property licenses.70
 When determining the antitrust implications of a settlement, the main inquiry 
by the DOJ examines the extent to which a particular restraint has anti-competitive 
effects on the relevant market.71 According to the Guidelines, restraints in a licensing 
arrangement may harm competition if the overall effect is that the arrangement:
1. Facilitates market division or price-fixing,
2. Facilitates coordination to increase price or reduce output, or
3.  Forecloses access to, or significantly raises the price of an important 
input in a relevant market.72
By strengthening barriers to entry in the book digitization market and promoting a 
monopoly, I contend that the Settlement may facilitate all three of these competitive 
harms due to its extensive grant of market power to Google. In addition, the 
Settlement directly incorporates horizontal price-fixing across all authors and 
publishers involved in the Settlement, which is of particular concern with respect to 
orphan works that will be sold under the terms of the Settlement. The following 
subsections address each of the anti-competitive antitrust concerns in detail.
 A. Horizontal Price-Fixing: Orphan Works and the Consumer Purchase Option
 The most striking antitrust issue of the Settlement regards the ability to 
horizontally fix the prices of orphan (i.e., unclaimed) works as a result of the 
Settlement. Under current law, orphan works with existing copyrights—those for 
68. Google Brief, supra note 10, at 31. 
69. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property (1995) [hereinafter Guidelines].
70. Adam Hemlock & Jennifer Wu, U.S. Antitrust Implications of Patent Licensing, 52 Fed. Lawyer 39, 41 
(June 2005). 
71. Guidelines, supra note 69, § 3.1.
72. Id.
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which the current copyright owner is unable to be located—are still bound by copyright 
protection.73 Individuals who attempt to reproduce or use an orphan work are therefore 
subject to lawsuits by the copyright owner should he or she reemerge and assert his or 
her rights. However, Google will not be subject to these risks under the terms of the 
Settlement because the orphan works’ copyright owners will be bound by the 
Settlement.74 According to the final summary notice distributed to rightsholders on 
the Google Settlement’s website, the Settlement “include[s] in-copyright written 
works, such as novels, textbooks, dissertations, and other writings, that were published 
or distributed in hard copy format on or before January 5, 2009.”75 Because the opt-out 
date of the Settlement has passed, the authors of these unclaimed orphan works have 
already opted-in to the Settlement’s terms.76 Thus, Google will be the only company 
able to sell these orphan works without fear of copyright infringement liability because 
it is the only company that would have court-granted immunity from such infringement 
claims once the settlement is approved.
 The pricing of orphan works under the Settlement represents a form of horizontal 
price-fixing.77 Under the Settlement, there are two options for the pricing of a book 
that is individually purchased—a specified price or a settlement-controlled price.78 
Although a copyright owner can provide a specified price for each work, the orphan 
copyright owners are not available to name these prices for orphan works. Thus, all 
orphan works will be subject to the Settlement’s default settlement controlled price.79 
Google sets the default price using a pricing algorithm, and Google only has to 
73. U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 1 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.
gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf (“Even where the user has made a reasonably diligent effort to find the 
owner . . . the user cannot reduce the risk of copyright liability for such use, because there is always a 
possibility, however remote, that a copyright owner could bring an infringement action after that use 
has begun.”). 
74. This is because the class bound by the settlement, by default, includes all in-copyright books published 
prior to January 5, 2009. Notice Documents: Original Summary Notice, Google Book Settlement, 
[hereinafter Google Settlement Notice], http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view_summary_
notice (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
75. Id. A rightsholder is any owner of a digitized book (or insert) who has not chosen to opt out of the settlement 
by September 4, 2009. Because few, if any, parties opt out of settlements with opt-in defaults, rightsholders 
are likely to constitute a substantial portion of all authors. However, once bound by the terms of the 
settlement, the rightsholders must still claim their copyright rights through a registration process to 
receive their share of the revenue pie from the GBS services. After this registration process, the copyright 
owner is then designated as a registered rightsholder.
76. On the other hand, if the class action lawsuit required the class members to affirmatively opt in to the 
settlement, the orphan works issue would not be a problem. As Randal Picker states, “the change in 
default positions is everything” for the orphan work rightsholders. Picker, supra note 17, at 3. 
77. Horizontal price-fixing occurs when competitors in a marketplace (in this case, individual authors and 
publishers) agree to set prices across an entire industry or marketplace. Blair & Kaserman, supra note 
12, at 173.
78. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.2(b)(i).
79. See id. § 4.2(b)(iii).
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demonstrate to the Registry that the algorithm is “reasonable” in order to use it.80 
Because this algorithm will determine the price of each orphan work bound by the 
Settlement, it constitutes a form of horizontal price-fixing by the authors and 
publishers who control the Registry.81 As the DOJ noted in its filing, courts have 
held joint price-setting mechanisms and formulas to be per se illegal.82 And, despite 
the creation of an “unclaimed works fiduciary” under the Amended Settlement 
Agreement, it is unclear how independent this entity will be from the authors and 
publishers who may potentially control prices.83 Thus, the creation of this entity may 
not fully constrain the authors’ and publishers’ ability to set default pricing schemes.
 There is also a general concern about the default price setting formula that is 
agreed to by the authors and publishers. In response to the DOJ’s first filing, the 
Amended Settlement Agreement clarified this formula. In particular, it indicated 
that the price setting formula would be designed “to operate in a manner that 
simulates how an individual Book would be priced by a rightsholder of that Book 
acting in a manner to optimize revenues in respect of such Book in a competitive 
market . . . .”84 As the Open Book Alliance noted in its objection to the Amended 
Settlement Agreement, however, the industry-wide pricing formula is illegal no 
matter how it is crafted.85 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. stands for the proposition that prices 
are fixed even when “the prices paid or charged are to be set at a certain level or 
ascending or descending scales, [or] if they are to be uniform, or if by various formulae 
they are related to the market prices.”86 Additionally, although the Registry has the 
right to verify the accuracy of the algorithm with third-party experts,87 Google 
explicitly disclaims any obligation to have its algorithm verified by experts other 
than those chosen by the Registry.88 Thus, if the formula is designed in an anti-
competitive fashion that benefits most rightsholders with monopoly profits, there 
80. Id. § 4.2(c)(ii)(2)–(4). The Registry only represents the Authors and Publishers. It is not clear that the 
authors and publishers would adequately represent the interests of the orphan works’ copyright owners.
81. Although the prices are dependent on a seemingly independent algorithm, horizontal competitors have 
agreed to fix prices according to the terms of that algorithm. 
82. See DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 21; Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134–35 
(1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 198–99, 222–23 (1940).
83. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Amended Settlement 
Agreement at 20, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010) 
[hereinafter DOJ ASA Statement], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f255000/255012.pdf. 
84. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.2(c)(ii)(2) (emphasis added).
85. Supplemental Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed 
Settlement at 7, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter Open Book Alliance Supplemental Memorandum], available at http://thepublicindex.org/
docs/amended_settlement/Open_Book_Alliance.pdf.
86. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222.
87. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.2(c)(ii)(3). 
88. Id.
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would be few incentives and little accountability to ensure that the formula truly 
does simulate prices in a competitive market.
 Although the DOJ is not opposed to Google’s unilateral use of a pricing 
algorithm, it is concerned that authors and publishers are agreeing to this algorithm.89 
This distinction is important because, while it may possibly be true that Google does 
not intend to use the settlement to restrict sources of searchable, digital libraries, it is 
possible that, by agreeing to this settlement (and its corresponding pricing formulae), 
the authors and publishers may intend to limit sources of digital libraries moving 
forward (e.g., by restricting licensing).90 Because the authors and publishers will wield 
power on the Registry that will set the terms for both pricing and future licensing of 
in-copyright books,91 the settlement does not foreclose the possibility that they will 
carry out this intention.
 The DOJ’s concerns are unsurprising given the long history of horizontal price-
fixing’s per se illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.92 When competing 
doctors attempted to fix prices for various medical services in Maricopa, for example, 
the Supreme Court determined that that was per se illegal.93 The court in Maricopa 
distinguished the price-fixing in that case from BMI, which had ruled that horizontal 
price-fixing could be legal when it was a “necessary consequence” of the creation of a 
blanket license that authorized broad uses of musical compositions.94 However, BMI 
does not apply to the Consumer Purchases of orphan books offered under the Google 
Book Settlement because, beyond offering integrated products, “Google will also act 
as a joint sales agent, offering each rightsholder’s books for individual sale.”95 The 
DOJ further distinguished BMI from the Settlement because rightsholders negotiate 
separately with BMI for their respective slices of the revenue pie.96 The Settlement 
89. DOJ ASA Statement, supra note 83, at 19.
90. Cf. Gary Reback, Free the Market: Why Only Government Can Keep the Marketplace 
Competitive 30 (2009) (discussing Bork’s argument that price-fixing should be unlawful when parties 
undertake an action where they intend to restrict output, even when such actions are taken in conjunction 
with a contract integration). 
91. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 6.2(b)(i)–(ii). The unclaimed works fiduciary 
prevents them from controlling the licensure of those books, but, as stated, it is not clear how independent 
that entity will actually be from the authors and publishers in practice. The authors and publishers can 
control the licensing terms of any claimed books within the GBS corpus.
92. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Antitrust Handbook (2007) 
[hereinafter Handbook]; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927).
93. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 353–56 (1982).
94. Id. at 355–56; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
95. See DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 31–32. Note that “consumer purchases” refers to Google’s 
contemplated service in which it will allow individual users to purchase full-text access to books, subject 
to copy-and-paste and printing limitations. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, §§ 1.35, 
4.2(a). “Institutional Subscriptions” is a contemplated service in which universities, corporations, 
libraries, and other institutions can purchase access to the full texts of all digitized books (or subsets of 
the book databases) for a subscription fee. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.1. 
96. See DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 32.
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does not ensure that such bilateral negotiations occur with all rightsholders despite 
the fact that, the Settlement leaves the door open for separate negotiations with some 
rightsholders, for example, through Google’s Partner Program.97 Overall, then, BMI 
should not be read to apply to the price-fixing of individual orphan works under the 
Consumer Purchase option that is proposed in the Settlement.98
 When there is no redeeming virtue to price-fixing, the Supreme Court is not 
deferential to price-fixing arrangements even when the fixed prices appear reasonable. 
This was the case in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Stores, Inc.,99 in which an agreement 
between competitor beer distributors to fix credit terms to wholesalers represented 
“[a] horizontal agreement to fix prices [that was] the archetypal example of such a 
practice. It has long been settled that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful per se. It 
is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable.”100 This further 
underscores the fact that, even if the price-setting algorithm sets hypothetically 
competitive prices, there is still an antitrust problem. Several months after my initial 
draft of this article, the DOJ emphasized that “features of the Settlement bear an 
uncomfortably close resemblance” to the types of price-fixing violations held illegal 
in Maricopa Country and Catalano.101
 In Google’s defense, the Settlement will make many books available for sale that 
would have not otherwise been available. And promoting availability of these books is 
in the public’s best interest. However, absent legislation from Congress that authorizes 
others to promote and sell these orphan works, the Settlement remains a court-
sanctioned monopoly with respect to orphan works. As the founder of the Internet 
Archive, Brewster Kahle—who is opposed to the Settlement—recently stated, “[w]e 
need to focus on legislation to address works that are in copyright limbo.”102
 Such legislation is foreseeable. Orphan works legislation proposed in 2008 would 
have allowed “good-faith [consumers] of copyrighted content to move forward in cases 
where they wish to license a use but cannot locate the copyright owner after a diligent 
search.”103 This legislation would enable identification of orphan works to become 
97. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 17.9 (“Google may already have, and may in the 
future enter into, separate agreements directly with individual members of the Amended Settlement 
Class regarding their Books, e.g., through the Google Partner Program.”).
98. See BMI, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
99. 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
100. Id. at 647.
101. See DOJ Statement, supra note 6, at 17. But see Google Brief, supra note 10, at 40 (noting that horizontal 
competitors agreed to horizontal price-fixing in ways that lacked precompetitive justifications). Besides 
noting concerns about the pricing algorithm, the DOJ also noted concerns about the standard revenue 
split of 63%-37% (the industry-wide revenue-sharing formula) as a potential price-fixing problem. DOJ 
Statement, supra note 6, at 19–22.
102. Brewster Kahle, A Book Grab By Google, Wash. Post, May 19, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/18/AR2009051802637.html. Brewster Kahle is the founder of the 
Internet Archive. Id.
103. Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 25, 2008), 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan.
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transparent and allow more agencies, including the Open Content Alliance, to obtain 
licenses to scan orphan works. The lawyers negotiating the Settlement obviously knew 
of this possibility, as they added a clause to the Settlement that allows Google to take 
advantage of any future legislative changes that allow the use of uniform works to the 
extent that competitors are using such legislation to impact Google.104 Thus, Google 
will never be placed at a competitive disadvantage by subsequent orphan works 
legislation. If orphan works legislation passes, it is also possible—but not guaranteed—
that the unclaimed works fiduciary proposed by the Settlement would license orphan 
works to other competing book digitizers.105 In that case, many of the anti-competitive 
concerns surrounding orphan books could be defrayed.
 In the absence of orphan works legislation, however, Google will be able to reap 
a significant first-mover advantage despite its failure to earn such a market position 
by sheer virtue of superior business acumen or skill. First, to the extent that Google 
achieves market position via anti-competitive tying,106 it has not fairly demonstrated 
its superior ability in the book search field.107 Second, to the extent that Google 
obtained its agreement and first mover advantage via willful misdirection108—i.e., 
collusive misrepresentation of its intentions to the exclusion of possible competition—
Google should not be rewarded.
 Meanwhile, the Settlement could provide more detail on efforts that will be 
undertaken to track down the copyright owners of the orphan works. Whereas the 
proposed federal legislation would force potential licensees to perform a “diligent 
search” prior to licensing orphan works,109 the original Settlement did not stipulate 
any procedure that the Registry or Google must follow to track down those authors. 
The Amended Settlement has been improved somewhat, as it now requires that the 
Registry “will, from its inception, use commercially reasonable efforts to locate 
rightsholders of books and inserts.”110 However, it is not clear what these reasonable 
efforts will be or how Google can be held accountable for them.111
104. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 3.8(b).
105. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 6.2(b)(i) (authorizing the unclaimed works 
fiduciary to license orphan works “to the extent permitted by law”).
106. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
107. Although Google’s business acumen has allowed it to achieve its prowess in the search field, I argue that 
book search results should not be tied to web search results unless consumers opt in. 
108. See Open Book Alliance Memorandum, supra note 18; see also Open Book Alliance Supplemental 
Memorandum, supra note 85.
109. Peters, supra note 103.
110. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 6.1(c).
111. A major concern arising from the original Settlement was that profits held in trust for orphan works’ 
copyright owners could have been redistributed back to both the Registry and the known rightsholders 
(authors and publishers) if funds allocated for the orphan works’ copyright owners are not claimed within 
five years. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 6.3(a). As a result, authors and publishers could have 
had a disincentive to locate the current copyright owners of orphan works. To the extent such disincentives 
exist in the Settlement—thereby preventing proactive searching for the orphan works’ copyright owners—
the Settlement is needlessly encouraging price-fixing. Even if one argues that price-fixing for orphan 
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 As a final reflection in this area, it is important to remember that, outside of the 
few isolated, independent book stores that may have copies of orphan works, Google 
will have no competitors in this market once the Settlement is agreed to. And, if the 
market is framed as the market for fully searchable, digitized books, Google has no 
competitors. Given that horizontal price-fixing is per se illegal under the Sherman 
Act, and Google has yet to pledge that its pricing algorithm will be transparent to 
the public,112 the DOJ has a profound interest to intervene. We have no idea how 
Google will choose to price orphan works, or how actively Google and the Registry 
will be working to track down those copyright owners, notwithstanding the 
“reasonable efforts” provision in the Amended Settlement. If the DOJ becomes more 
involved, they can work with Google and the Registry to set a minimum standard for 
tracking down these copyright owners.
 There are several ways to improve the Settlement that address the anti-competitive 
effects of price-fixing for orphan works. First, the Settlement should be modified to 
provide explicit mechanisms for third-party licensure of orphan works through the 
Registry. While this appears to be a possibility under the Settlement, it is not guaranteed 
and, absent legislation that allows third parties to begin using orphan works, third 
parties need to be able—or at least theoretically able—to compete with Google on an 
equal footing immediately. In addition, the Settlement needs to be modified to provide 
incentives for locating the rightsholders of orphan works. For example, Google, the 
Authors, or the Publishers could be provided with a royalty for each rightsholder that 
is located from the pot of unclaimed funds—this royalty should be large enough to 
provide an incentive to search, but small enough such that unclaimed funds are 
ultimately reserved for the rightsholders who are entitled to them.
 B. Institutional Subscriptions, Predatory Pricing, and Blanket Licensing
 Another potential risk of the Settlement is that it could encourage predatory 
pricing. This is particularly true for the Settlement’s institutional subscription 
component. The issue was first flagged by Robert Darnton, Director of the Harvard 
University Library, who argues that although “Google may choose to be generous in its 
pricing . . . it could also employ a strategy comparable to the one that proved to be so 
effective in pushing up the price of scholarly journals: first, entice subscribers with low 
initial rates, and then, once they are hooked, ratchet up the rates as high as the traffic 
works is deemed to be a “necessary consequence” of the Settlement, the Settlement should not actively 
promote it. Although it is unrealistic—and probably impossible—to require Google to track down all 
owners of orphan works copyrights, the Settlement should at least require diligent searches for these 
authors if it allows Google, the Authors, and the Publishers to reap monopoly profits from these works. 
Luckily, however, this redistributive provision was removed—unclaimed profits derived from orphan 
works will be redistributed to countries for the purpose of providing these funds to literacy-based charities. 
See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 6.3(a)(i)(3). 
112. The Settlement explicitly states that Google is not required to disclose confidential information relating 
to the algorithm. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.2(c)(ii)(3).
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will bear.”113 The president of the Association of College and Research Libraries 
(ACRL), Erika Linke, recently expressed her concern that “the cost of an institutional 
subscription may skyrocket . . .” under the Settlement.114 The consumers of digital 
books in libraries—faculty, students, and library patrons—are not price sensitive and 
therefore Google and others could easily take advantage of such a pricing strategy.115 
According to one study, “[t]he current publishing environment is a monopoly-like 
marketplace increasingly dominated by large commercial conglomerates.”116
 The Settlement explicitly opens the door for this sort of pricing strategy. Under 
the Settlement, “the initial Pricing Strategy will also include a discount from the 
List Prices that will be offered for a limited period of time to subscribers.”117 While 
potentially noble in its intention, this initial plan could merely be a mechanism for 
the baiting scheme described by Darnton.118 Once consumers at libraries, schools, 
and other institutions begin realizing the benefits of institutional subscriptions, they 
are likely to place additional pressure on subscribing institutions to maintain their 
subscriptions, regardless of any potential price increases by Google or the Registry. 
Once consumers are comfortable with using a particular search system for digitized 
books, they begin to rely on that system and are less likely to be interested in potential 
competitors who may offer equivalent services. This happens frequently in the 
university context; even when librarians attempt to cancel institutional subscriptions 
that may be underutilized or increasingly difficult to afford; publishers are often 
“moved into the driver’s seat” due to the “political realities in the university” that 
make it difficult to cancel large bundles of titles from a particular publisher.119 These 
reliance interests would create an artificial barrier to entry by potential competitors 
and allow Google to maintain a monopoly position.
 Google could engage in a predatory pricing scheme that violates the Sherman 
Act if it sets its institutional subscription prices extraordinarily low at the outset and 
recoups its losses by charging higher prices later. In the antitrust context, predatory 
pricing generally takes this form. According to Judge Easterbrook in A.A. Poultry 
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., the legality of this behavior hinges on whether or 
not the entity accused of predatory pricing is in a position to eventually recoup its 
113. Robert Darnton, Google & the Future of Books, N.Y. Rev. Books (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/google-the-future-of-books/. 
114. Press Release, Ass’n of Research Libraries, Library Assistants Ask Judge To Assert Vigorous Oversight 
of Proposed Google Book Search Settlement (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/
google-book-search-pr-4may09.pdf.
115. See Open Book Alliance Memorandum, supra note 18, at 9.
116. Nancy Kranich, Scholarly Publications Hold Universities Hostage: Monopoly on Journals Causes Prices to 
Soar, FAIR: Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (Jan./Feb. 1999), http://www.fair.org/index.php? 
page=3784.
117. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.1(a)(vi)(2).
118. See Darnton, supra note 113. 
119. See id. 
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losses.120 In particular, “if there can be no ‘later’ in which recoupment could occur, 
then the consumer is an unambiguous beneficiary even if the current price is less 
than the cost of production.”121 In those instances, the pricing schemes do not justify 
antitrust inquiries 122 because an attempt to recoup losses by significantly raising 
prices would be easily undercut by a competitor in a competitive market.
 However, there is a reasonably strong argument that Google will be able to 
recoup its losses once the Settlement is agreed to. As of now, Google is the primary 
digitizer of books that will attempt to sell its books for profit. The Open Content 
Alliance, which has digitized the next largest stock of books, is a non-profit that 
only digitizes public domain works. Even if one assumes that the Amazon Kindle or 
analogous products are part of the same market of fully searchable, digitized books,123 
it is unlikely that those entities would have the capacity to sell institutional 
subscriptions that would rival Google’s collection within the next couple of years. 
Thus, a scenario in which Google offered very cheap institutional subscriptions 
initially—further discouraging potential competitors from entering the market—is 
foreseeable because the market currently has little competition, and Google can have 
reasonable confidence in its ability to raise its prices later to recover losses. And, 
Google can partake in this behavior without demonstrating that it legitimately has a 
superior product relative to its potential competitors. Although the courts have been 
skeptical of many predatory pricing strategies,124 the use of such a “pre-commitment 
predation strategy”—where a party strategically undercuts a competitor to gain 
market share and monopoly profits later—may make sense economically to a company 
that is motivated to earn profits.125 Professor Bork is quite skeptical of this form of 
predation, arguing that a predator can only be successful if it “has greatly 
disproportionate reserves or is able to inflict disproportionate losses.”126 But even he 
may concede that predation is theoretically possible in the GBS context because the 
GBS products that are being sold by Google have an approximate marginal cost of 
zero, allowing it to charge cheap prices while possible competitors struggle to recoup 
the massive startup costs necessary to enter the book digitization field.127
120. 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. 
122. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for 
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213 (1979). 
123. Per the earlier analysis, I argue that the market for digitized, searchable books is distinct from a market 
for books that are in a digital form that are used on a manufacturer’s platform.
124. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Inc., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); A.A. Poultry 
Farms, 881 F.2d at 1396.
125. Charles J. Goetz & Fred S. McChesney, Antitrust Law: Interpretation and Implementation 
447 (4th ed. 2009). 
126. Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 147 (1993).
127. In particular, the costs of scanning the books and creating a competing digital book database.
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 Because the predatory pricing concern is purely speculative, this is only an issue 
in the Settlement to the extent that the Settlement does not foreclose Google (and 
the Registry’s) ability to partake in such behavior. Following Google’s well-known 
motto of “don’t be evil,” Google may very well price institutional subscriptions in a 
way that serves the public interest and encourages competitive entry in that particular 
area. Still, both Google and the Registry will have little public accountability under 
the Settlement once the pricing strategies are agreed upon. All modifications in 
pricing must be agreed upon by both Google and the Registry, and only arbitrators 
are allowed to resolve disputes between those entities.128 There is no mechanism for 
public accountability on pricing strategies—neither the libraries nor government 
entities are given any regulatory authority over the agency.129
 In its most recent brief, Google explained that it has signed agreements with its 
library partners, such as the University of Michigan, that allows those partners to 
challenge whether the institutional subscription price meets the “broad access” 
objectives espoused in the Settlement.130 This provision promotes the public interest 
principles I endorse in this article. But it only ensures that certain parties outside of 
the Registry have an opportunity to challenge predatory pricing schemes. The 
University of Michigan made significant concessions in its negotiations for this deal. 
In particular, it will have little, if any, reason to challenge predatory pricing schemes 
given that it has a twenty-five year waiver on institutional subscription fees.131 This 
raises the question: Why is the right to challenge institutional pricing schemes 
through arbitration available only to certain libraries and is not available to all 
libraries or to the public in general?
 Despite these potential issues with the rules governing the pricing of institutional 
subscriptions, blanket licensing of digitized books through institutional subscriptions 
is unlikely to be construed as per se illegal under the Sherman Act. This is because 
BMI squares more directly with institutional subscriptions than it does with consumer 
purchases. In BMI, the Supreme Court ruled that blanket licensing of composed 
music to television stations was “not a naked [restraint] of trade with no purpose 
except stif ling of competition, but rather accompanies the integration of sales, 
monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use.”132 The Court 
determined that blanket licensing was a necessary end in achieving efficiency.133 
When blanket licenses are offered as a means to an efficient outcome, those licenses 
128. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.1(a)(vi)(4).
129. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.1 (making no reference to any entity other than 
Google and the Registry setting pricing mechanisms).
130. Google Brief, supra note 10, at 48.
131. Miguel Helft, Google Book-Scanning Pact to Give Libraries Input on Price, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2009, 
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/technology/companies/21google.html. Because the University of 
Michigan will not have to pay institutional subscription fees itself, it is less likely that it will express 
concern when institutional subscription rates are unreasonably high. 
132. BMI, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). 
133. See id. at 21.
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are permissible even if there are realistic alternatives (such as individual licenses) to 
the blanket licensing, whether or not those alternatives are implemented.134
 Nevertheless, if narrower licensing alternatives are shown to be more efficient than 
broader blanket licenses in the book digitization context, an adamant insistence by 
Google or the Registry to provide broad blanket licenses could raise antitrust concerns. 
As Judge Winter indicated in his concurring opinion in Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, injury to consumers could be 
possible if alternative licensing arrangements are “impeded by agreement among 
composers or producers or by some other artificial barrier.”135 And, although the 
majority in BMI ruled that the bulk licensing in that case was not per se unlawful, 
Justice Stevens noted in dissent that “[t]he ASCAP system requires users to buy more 
music than they want at a price which, while not beyond their ability to pay and perhaps 
not even beyond what is ‘reasonable’ for the access they are getting, may well be far 
higher than what they would choose to spend for music in a competitive system.”136 
Despite television stations’ requests for more limited use authorizations for the music at 
issue in the case, ASCAP and BMI strictly adhered to a policy in which they only 
offered blanket and per-program licenses of the entire repertoire of music.137
 Although such broad licensing was deemed efficient and within the rule of reason 
by the courts in BMI, ASCAP, and other cases, the efficiency inquiry in this case 
differs in several respects. Unlike the for-profit media corporations that were affected 
by ASCAP and BMI, many of the institutions in the market for institutional 
subscriptions are non-profit libraries, schools, and local government entities. Thus, 
many of these entities are not likely to have significant resources and the Settlement 
may not set up terms that allow them to fairly obtain or utilize the GBS corpus. Even 
assuming that the licensing arrangement contemplated by the Settlement is acceptable 
under BMI, as some have argued,138 the limited ability of certain public entities to 
obtain access to digital materials—due to their limited resources—may be a relevant 
consideration under antitrust doctrine. As noted, the DOJ has signaled the importance 
of access to knowledge principles in its initial assessment of the Settlement.139 Court 
precedent, furthermore, has indicated that courts may consider the interests of third-
134. See, e.g., Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), 744 F.2d 917 
(2d Cir. 1984).
135. Id. at 934 (Winter, J., concurring).
136. BMI, 441 U.S. at 31–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 27–28.
138. See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 51–52 (arguing that, like the licensing arrangement held to withstand 
antitrust scrutiny in BMI, Elhauge argues that the GBS Settlement is precompetitive because it lowers 
transaction costs of negotiating with millions of rightsholders while creating a new product (the 
institutional subscription) that would have been impossible to create absent the settlement); see also 
Amicus Brief of Antitrust Law and Economics Professors in Support of the Settlement at 23–25, 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
Professors’ Brief], available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/antitrust_profs.pdf (arguing that 
the settlement compares favorably to BMI). 
139. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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parties to the settlement as well as the interests of those involved in evaluating class 
settlements.140 Courts should thus consider moving towards a regime that is 
increasingly mindful of the broader public interest in its antitrust assessments.
 Many non-profit and government institutions may be interested in securing 
relatively narrow licensing arrangements. For example, a medical school library may 
only be interested in licensing GBS for a market basket of medical books. Thus, the 
efficiency of institutional subscriptions will hinge on the manner in which they are 
partitioned across disciplines and sub-fields. Finally, institutional subscription 
arrangements between schools, libraries, and the Registry will impact the public 
interest much more than arrangements between CBS and ASCAP to license music. 
While our ability to read, access, and attain knowledge has a fairly strong connection 
to our survival, our interest in obtaining licensed music is important but is much less 
determinative of our long-term success and well-being.
 The Settlement addresses some of these key differences in several respects when 
it discusses institutional pricing. For example, the Settlement states that institutional 
subscription pricing bands “may vary across broad categories of institutions.”141 The 
Settlement also allows the Registry to establish different prices for corporations, 
schools, government, higher education, and other agreed upon entities. Moreover, 
the Settlement also allows Google to identify institutional subscriptions “for a small 
number of discipline-based collections of Books that Google would offer as an 
alternative . . . .”142 Thus, if Google and the Registry function in the public interest 
by pricing reasonably and dividing subscriptions into smaller collections that serve 
the interests of various institutions, the Settlement could allow Google to provide 
institutional subscriptions in an economically fair and efficient manner that would 
be affordable for a wide-range of institutions.
 However, these provisions by no means guarantee that the public interest will be 
served. The fact that Google may set different prices for institutions with different 
levels of need does not guarantee that Google will set those different prices. Even if 
Google wanted to charge reasonable prices, there is also no guarantee that the Registry 
would necessarily agree with every proposal Google makes—the Registry is just as 
much a potential monopolist as Google. The provision that allows Google to divvy up 
institutional subscriptions into smaller discipline-based chunks has no enforcement 
mechanism, and we cannot be sure that Google will actually provide those options.143
 Another disconcerting clause in the Settlement requires that Google design the 
pricing structure of the smaller versions of the institutional subscriptions in a way that 
provides incentives to purchase full subscriptions.144 This particular clause could result 
140. E.g., Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig. v. Franklin Riley, 957 F.2d 1020, 1025–27 
(2d Cir. 1992).
141. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.1(a)(iv).
142. Id. § 4.1(a)(v).
143. See id.
144. Id. (“To provide an incentive for institutions to subscribe to the entire Institutional Subscription 
Database, Google shall design the pricing of the different versions of the Institutional Subscription such 
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in pricing schemes that result in relatively inefficient cost structures. Assume for 
simplicity that an institutional subscription for the full GBS database costs a flat $1 
million per year (for a particular institution). Google could then choose to charge 
$500,000 per year for the institutional subscription that only covered medical books. 
While these books would comprise far less than fifty percent of all books in the GBS 
database (let us assume that medical books comprise ten percent of the entire database), 
the terms of the Settlement would not only allow—but encourage—such a pricing 
scheme to encourage a medical school library to purchase a full subscription when it is 
unlikely to need access to many of the other books. A more reasonable price would be 
closer to $100,000 since this is proportional to the cost of the entire set of books. Thus, 
given our public interest goals of information accessibility and public transparency, a 
better settlement would place some proactive limits on such pricing schemes. If, as 
Google claims, the Settlement truly is pro-competitive, initial regulations governing 
the Settlement Agreement can be loosened once competitors are freely able to enter the 
market. Until that point, however, consumers need some form of protection.
 Beyond these concerns, public libraries or universities could be priced out of 
broad institutional licenses based on the pricing model contemplated by the 
Settlement, which is based on the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) at each 
institution.145 In the context of online journal and database subscriptions, FTE is 
often assessed as the number of persons in an organization (the number of students 
and faculty in an educational organization), regardless of their patterns of use.146 At 
a recent talk, the New York Public Library’s (NYPL) director of Digital Strategy, 
Josh Greenberg, emphasized that one of the major challenges public libraries face in 
accessing library technology is the existence of FTE pricing.147 The NYPL, for 
example, cannot provide remote access to JSTOR because its FTE pricing is 
prohibitive.148 In addition, FTE pricing has been disproportionately burdensome on 
European universities in the past because these universities do not record their 
student data in FTE.149
that the price for access to the entire Institutional Subscription Database will be less than the sum of the 
prices for access to the discipline-based collections.”).
145. Id. § 4.1(a). Full-time-equivalent is a figure that represents a person who works full-time at an institution. 
Id. § 4.1(a)(iii). The FTE calculation serves as a proxy for the number of employees who are at a workplace 
at any given time. For example, if a workplace has three full time workers and two half time workers, that 
workplace would have an FTE of 4 (3 x 1 + 2 x 0.5 = 4). This would more accurately illustrate the amount 
of use of a particular computer terminal than adding up the number of employees directly (5).
146. See, e.g., Opt-in Access to New Journals, Wiley Online Library, http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/
Section/id-406102.html (last visited October 4, 2010) (noting that FTE calculation is based on the 
number of students and faculty, excluding staff). 
147. Josh Greenberg, Dir. of Digital Strategy, N.Y. Pub. Library, Remarks at The Future of the Library, 
Info. Soc’y Project Yale Law Sch. (April 4, 2009), http://yaleisp.org/2009/04/panel-1-the-future-
of-the-library/.
148. Id.
149. See Lluís Anglada & Nuria Comellas, What’s Fair? Pricing Models in the Electronic Era, 23 Libr. Mgmt., 
no. 4/5, 2002 at 227, 231.
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 The universal use of FTE as a pricing model for GBS could be construed as a 
distinct form of price-fixing that is neither an accurate nor fair gauge of the true 
value of the product.150 Should the NYPL be charged for all nine million of NYC’s 
residents when it licenses JSTOR or Google Books, or should it more appropriately 
be charged based on usage patterns? Although the Settlement does indicate that the 
FTE pricing can vary across institutional types,151 it is not clear that the pricing will 
be set in a way that conforms with access to knowledge or antitrust principles. This 
is yet another provision that could be more narrowly tailored. Again, the Settlement 
leaves consumers in the dark.
 Another pricing option that could provide a better balance between affordability 
and accessibility is the simultaneous user-pricing model. Under this model, libraries 
such as the NYPL could use data on actual usage patterns—from both in-library and 
remote use—to gauge how many consumers will access the GBS database at any 
given time. Although estimates above or below actual usage patterns are possible 
under such a scheme—and these miscalculations will inevitably create some 
inefficiencies—subscription terms can be set at short enough durations to provide 
libraries with some f lexibility to dynamically adjust their prices.152 One possible 
compromise to minimize inefficiencies would be to start with a conservative number 
of simultaneous users and include a sliding scale in the license that can be automatically 
upgraded to the maximum number given by the institution based on usage patterns.153 
Such a model would be much more commensurate with the value of the services 
being provided by GBS.
 The efficiency gains from blanket licenses cannot be denied. As Professor 
Richard Epstein notes, however, “[a]ll license types may not be created equal, and it 
could be possible to impose restrictions on the different license types in ways that do 
little to compromise the efficiency gains from coordination, while reducing the 
potential for monopoly rents.”154 Although some licensing improvements have been 
made in the ASCAP context, the DOJ still laments after over sixty years of government 
regulation:
[N]otwithstanding the AFJ’s requirement that ASCAP offer broadcasters a 
genuine economic choice between the per-program and blanket license, 
ASCAP has resisted offering a reasonable per-program license, forcing users 
desiring such a license to engage in protracted litigation, and often successfully 
150. Although FTE pricing is a generally acceptable form of pricing, I argue that it is less than optimal from 
a consumer welfare standpoint. I would not necessarily contend that FTE pricing constitutes a form of 
per se illegal price-fixing, but that it may present antitrust concerns in areas where consumer 
considerations may be substantial, such as this one. This is certainly more of a normative than a legal 
position, but the consumer implications in this Settlement are unprecedented (at least in my view). 
151. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 4.1(a)(iv).
152. See Anne E. McKee, Consortial Licensing Issues: One Consortium’s Viewpoint, 42 J. Libr. Admin. 129, 
135 (2005).
153. Id.
154. Richard A. Epstein, Antitrust Consent Decrees in Theory and Practice: Why Less Is More 
32 (2007).
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dissuading users from attempting to take advantage of competitive alternatives 
to the blanket license.155
Litigation over FTE licensing requirements, discipline-based collection pricing, and 
other components of GBS’s pricing model is a distinct long-term possibility if the 
Settlement is approved in its current form.
 Thus, price-fixing loopholes that may affect accessibility and affordability should 
be continually addressed by the DOJ and other interested parties both before and 
after the district court formally certifies the Settlement.156 Although the opportunity 
to fix prices for institutional subscriptions is not per se unlawful based on current 
precedent,157 we currently have an opportunity to ensure that the Settlement is 
acceptable under a rule of reason analysis by modifying the Settlement to (1) limit 
price increases for institutional subscriptions in a manner that prevents predatory 
pricing schemes; (2) constrain incentive pricing for discipline-based collections by 
guaranteeing that these collections are priced in rough proportion to their 
representation in the larger GBS database; and (3) clearly define FTE pricing under 
the Settlement and provide libraries with the option to use a simultaneous user-
pricing model. A fourth, more normative consideration would guarantee that Google 
and the Registry agree to different price levels for institutions that genuinely reflect 
these institutions’ abilities to pay for services.158 Competition law may turn a blind 
eye to this fourth proposal, but such a change would serve our public values.
 C. Barriers to Entry: Collective Action Problems159
 The Settlement will not alleviate significant barriers to entry for potential 
competitors who desire to enter the book digitization market. By neither affirming 
nor denying the validity of Google’s actions under copyright law, the Settlement will 
create a presumption that book digitization of copyrighted works is illegal under 
155. Memorandum of the United States in Support of the Joint Motion to Enter a Second Amended Final 
Judgment at 28, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 41-1395).
156. The judge on the case is Judge Denny Chin. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
157. See, e.g., BMI, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that blanket licensing is not per se unlawful).
158. Google has shown some signs that it may be willing to negotiate separate deals with different institutions. 
For example, the University of Michigan has negotiated an amended deal with Google that will allow it 
to access the full institutional subscription database for free over the next twenty-five years. After the 
twenty-five years pass, the amended agreement provides the University with a discount that is 
proportional to the number of books Google is allowed to scan from the University’s library. See 
Amendment to Cooperative Agreement, Regents of the University of Michigan and Google, Inc., (May 
19, 2009), available at http://www.lib.umich.edu/mdp/Amendment-to-Cooperative-Agreement.pdf.
159. Barriers to Entry, as discussed in this paper, refer to barriers to enter the market for fully searchable, 
digitized books—this includes full-scale digitized book databases as well as small innovative solutions 
that could be applied to that market. I acknowledge that any potential competitor could attain individual 
licenses for digitized books if it were able to negotiate with individual copyright owners—and possibly 
the Registry—to obtain such licenses. Collective action problems arise in contexts where it is difficult to 
get a wide range of individuals representing different interest to agree on a common arrangement. 
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existing copyright law. The high litigation costs of any copyright challenge faced by 
a potential book digitizer would be a significant deterrent—this Settlement alone 
will cost Google $125 million.160 And that number does not include litigation costs. 
Thus, notwithstanding the potential validity of future fair use challenges, potential 
competitors moving forward with book digitization will do so knowing that they 
will need to obtain full licensure of copyrighted works before implementing their 
book digitization plans. However, this would be expensive. Well over 20,000 
publishers are bound by the GBS Settlement, along with the millions of authors who 
wrote works published by them.161 Beyond the sheer costs of licensure, obtaining 
separate agreements with each author and publisher who has published a book will 
impose significant transaction costs on any potential competitor.
 Some may say, however, that Google’s possible competitors are not foreclosed 
from achieving a similar settlement. In particular, supporters of the Settlement have 
emphasized that the transaction costs of obtaining a new deal with Authors and 
Publishers have been reduced by Google’s efforts to obtain licensure using the class 
action mechanism.162 While this may be true, it would be highly wasteful to incur 
additional litigation costs through another lawsuit. And the DOJ agrees.163 A GBS 
competitor’s ability to successfully pursue litigation efforts does not represent a 
measure of one’s superiority in the market for digital books, and to the extent that 
the settlement establishes a context where a competitor must litigate to establish an 
equal footing with Google, artificial barriers to entry remain.164
 Further, there is a legitimate question of whether or not potential competitors 
were collusively excluded from the bargaining table when Google made its deal with 
Authors and Publishers. Gary Reback, an antitrust lawyer known for his involvement 
in the Microsoft case,165 explains that Google acted by willful misdirection and a fait 
accompli—while Google asserted that it was creating GBS as a mere digital card 
catalog, it denied consumers and Google’s competitors seats at the bargaining table 
over a twenty-nine month period.166 Thus, while Microsoft was operating a book 
scanning program that comported with copyright law in good faith, Google was 
160. See Press Release, Google, Inc., Google, Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark Settlement: 
Copyright Accord Would Make Millions More Books Available Online (Oct. 28, 2008), (on file with 
author), available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20081027_booksearchagreement.html.
161. See id.
162. See Professors’ Brief, supra note 138, at 22–23.
163. DOJ ASA Statement, supra note 83, at 25 (“The suggestion that a competitor should follow Google’s 
lead by copying books en masse without permission in the hope of prompting a class action suit to be 
settled on terms comparable to the ASA [Amended Settlement Agreement] is poor public policy and 
not something the antitrust laws require a competitor to do.”).
164. Admittedly, a normative question remains: What is a “reasonable” or appropriate “barrier to entry?” As 
Professor Bork has said, some barriers are natural and others are artificial. In my view, litigation and 
settlement efforts are disconnected from the sorts of business efficiencies that should be encouraged by 
antitrust laws. For a discussion of this distinction, see Bork, supra note 126, at 321.
165. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
166. See Open Book Alliance Memorandum, supra note 18. 
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secretly negotiating its special deal.167 As Amazon reasonably notes in its objection to 
the Amended Settlement, moreover, competitors could have come up with the same 
database as Google over the course of the Settlement negotiations, but they have not 
indiscriminately scanned books or created the same products because doing so “[would 
have been] illegal, not because of lack of innovation by competitors in the marketplace.”168 If 
these alleged facts are true, there is a reasonable argument that the barriers for 
obtaining similar terms as Google should be significantly lowered if, for example, 
the DOJ forces the parties to agree to the Settlement with the condition that similar 
terms will be offered to competitors. Even if competitors are offered the exact same 
terms the day after the Settlement is approved, these competitors would still have to 
develop their own technologies to allow consumers to view and search digital books. 
Thus, such a condition would not unreasonably impact Google’s ability to compete.
 The Settlement, meanwhile, removes virtually all collective action problems that 
would be faced by Google in negotiating terms to use copyrighted works in its 
database due to the broad scope of the class. All books published prior to January 
2009 will be covered by the Settlement (with the exception of those authors who 
chose to opt-out out of the Settlement). The Settlement then creates the Book Rights 
Registry—a non-profit entity—which disburses the revenues that are entitled to the 
Authors and Publishers and assumes the responsibilities of price-setting. This would 
not be a problem if the Settlement did not confer unfair advantages to Google. 
Although the Settlement contains a non-exclusivity clause,169 for example, the overall 
state of affairs promotes a de facto exclusivity for Google.170 As would be suggested by 
my market definition, the DOJ notes that the Settlement would allow “Google, and 
no other entity, to compete in a marketplace that the parties seek to create.”171 In the 
post-settlement world—no competitor will be in a comparable market position in the 
market for fully searchable, digital books.
 Although the digitized books may hypothetically be licensed through the 
Registry or some other entity under the Settlement,172 the Settlement guarantees 
third party licensing in only two narrow circumstances. First, there is an additional 
contemplated rightsholder services provider that can be solicited by the Registry if 
Google fails to implement both consumer purchases and institutional subscriptions 
within five years of the Settlement Agreement.173 Second, the Settlement allows the 
167. See id. at 19–20.
168. Amazon Objection, supra note 64, at 11 (emphasis added).
169. This fact has been stressed by the camp that believes the settlement is pro-competitive. E.g., Elhauge, 
supra note 7, at 7 (“Because every right that the settlement gives Google to digitize, display, or sell books 
is expressly non-exclusive, the settlement in no way increases the barriers to entry imposed by these 
costs.”).
170. See DOJ ASA Statement, supra note 83, at 21–23. 
171. Id. at 21.
172. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 2.4.
173. Id. § 3.7(c). 
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Registry to solicit a third party competitor if Google fails to provide a set of “Required 
Library Services,” described below.
 In the first circumstance, the Settlement also allows the Registry to solicit a 
third party to offer consumer purchases and institutional subscriptions if Google 
does not provide the Authors and Publishers with “replacement monetization 
opportunities” within one year of discontinuing the services.174 This clause allows a 
third party entrant to the market only if (1) Google chooses not to compete, or (2) 
Google is so derelict in its basic duties under the Settlement that the Registry is 
forced to find another, more suitable, competitor.
 Under the Settlement there is also a possibility that, prior to the stipulated five-
year period within which Google must implement consumer purchases and 
institutional subscriptions, Google could choose to forego providing the services and 
prevent any additional competitor from entering the market through a bargain with 
the Registry.175 For example, if Google determined two years from the Settlement 
Agreement that the GBS services were no longer a major priority for them (but 
possibly something they may want to get involved with later), they could choose to 
continue to provide “replacement monetization opportunities” from the second to the 
fifth year after the Settlement was formally certified.176 But this would prevent the 
Registry from soliciting a third party service provider until the fifth year. In the 
meantime, the Authors and Publishers may be content with the funds they receive 
from Google, despite the fact that the services would not be provided for the 
intervening three years and competitors could be denied from formally entering the 
market. Under the Settlement, Google could then re-enter the market within the 
fifth year and maintain its superior market position.177 The fact that “replacement 
monetization opportunities” are even contemplated by the Settlement illustrates that 
the Settlement is as much about profitability as it is about ensuring that a digitized 
book database is universally accessible. Neither the three-year hiatus of services nor 
the reemerging monopoly scenario is in the public interest. Yet both are possible 
under the Settlement.
 The second context in which the Settlement allows the Registry to solicit a third 
party competitor is when Google fails to provide a set of “Required Library 
Services.”178 These required library services are meant to ensure that the vast majority 
of digitized books are searchable for research purposes in libraries—the requirement, 
in fact, requires that at least eighty-five percent of library scans be searchable online 
174. Id. § 3.7(c).
175. Id. §§ 3.7(c), 4.7.
176. Id. § 3.7(a) (defined as opportunities comparable to Contemplated Rightsholder Services, which are 
services provided by Google that allow a user limited or full online access for a fee).
177. This scenario is admittedly unlikely, but possible, and therefore should be acknowledged.
178. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 7.2(e)(ii). Beyond the settlement’s requirements to provide for-
profit services such as institutional subscriptions and consumer purchase opportunities, the required 
library services requirement requires Google to guarantee the searchability of at least 85% of books 
through the use of an online database along with corresponding links to libraries for each book in the 
database. Id. § 7.2(e)(i).
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through Google products and services.179 Such services are vital to the public interest 
goals of the Settlement. Thus, the Settlement provides that, if Google fails to provide 
the Required Library Services requirement, the Registry “may seek to engage one or 
more third parties to provide any or all of the Required Library Services.”180 However, 
such a third party provider can only be solicited if Google fails to uphold its part of 
the bargain. Based on Google’s significant interest in the GBS product, this would 
be highly unlikely.
 In theory, a potential Google competitor could create its own book rights registry 
to mitigate its collective action problems. However, Richard Sarnoff, Chairman of the 
Association of American Publishers, has admitted that the structure of the Registry 
would be “tough to replicate for [Google’s] competitors.”181 Furthermore, the creation 
of multiple registries may create other collective action problems while limiting the 
efficiency advantages that such entities attempt to mitigate.182 The existence of one 
registry, however, will only serve the public interest if it can be a clearinghouse for all 
who wish to enter the book digitization market. It should negotiate on behalf of all 
publishers and authors whenever a potential Google competitor wants to enter the 
market, not simply when Google fails to hold up its end of the bargain with respect to 
the Settlement. It should also charge reasonable prices.
 As currently drafted, the prevailing interest in these settlement clauses is not to 
ensure competition. First, the Settlement does not provide incentives to secure a 
competitor to Google. To maximize opportunities for competition under the 
Settlement, the Settlement would, again, guarantee that third party service providers 
could and would be sought after in multiple circumstances, not just those where 
Google fails to perform. As far as the Authors and Publishers are concerned, as long 
as some entity is distributing digitized books—possibly at monopoly or inf lated 
prices—there may not be incentives to locate additional providers. Although the 
Registry may license to third parties, this is still not guaranteed by the Amended 
Settlement.
 In response to concerns that competitors such as Amazon, Barnes and Noble, 
and others would not be able to sell orphan works in the Google Books corpus should 
the Settlement be approved, a reseller provision was added to the Amended Settlement 
Agreement.183 This provision allows Google’s competitors to sell books—including 
179. Id. § 7.2(e)(i).
180. Id. § 7.2(e)(ii).
181. Timothy B. Lee, Publisher Speculates About Amazon/Google E-Book “Duopoly,” Ars Technica, (Feb. 23, 
2009, 7:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/02/publisher-speculates-about-
amazongoogle-e-book-duopoly.ars.
182. The creation of multiple registries, for example, would force the owner of a digital book corpus to 
negotiate with several different registries to offer all of their books. Beyond forcing entities like Google 
to negotiate with multiple parties, this may be somewhat inefficient because each registry may also have 
distinct negotiation policies and procedures. 
183. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, § 4.5(b)(v)(2) (“To the extent that Google makes 
Books available through Consumer Purchases pursuant to this Amended Settlement Agreement, 
Google will allow resellers to sell access to such Books to their end users.”).
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orphan books—that appear in the GBS database.184 However, this provision does not 
promote competition or lower barriers to entry for two reasons. First, it solely applies 
to books purchased under the Consumer Purchase model.185 It therefore does not 
allow resellers to compete over institutional subscriptions, for example. More 
importantly, the reseller clause could actually undermine competition because Google 
continues to host the digital copies of books that are sold under this provision.186 
Thus, it merely enlists potential competitors as agents of Google while Google 
continues to reap a share—albeit a smaller one—of the profits. As the Open Book 
Alliance notes, “forcing all of the new vendors to depend on a single source, Google, 
for many of the digital books they intend to offer is the surest way to retard what are 
otherwise boundless prospects” for innovation in the digital book industry.187
 Thus, given these uncertainties and the potentially damaging limitations on 
competitors’ rights to freely enter the book digitization market, one of the 
recommendations of this analysis is to fine-tune the Settlement to unambiguously 
allow the Registry to engage additional providers who could potentially provide book 
digitization services. This would alleviate concerns (1) that there could be gaps in 
service provisions, and (2) that there could be long-term monopolistic control of the 
market for fully searchable, digitized books. In addition, the Settlement should 
guarantee that some entity is always providing book digitization services in the event 
Google chooses to abdicate its role as a service provider. Whether the authority 
should revert to the government or another private entity is unclear, but the Settlement 
should not allow “replacement monetization opportunities” in lieu of the GBS 
service. Another consideration would be to require compulsory licensing of Google’s 
entire corpus of digital books to competitors—this would reduce barriers to entry 
into the market while allowing competitors to quickly gain an equal footing in 
relation to Google once the Settlement is approved.188 Such a provision, however, 
must ensure that Google receives appropriate compensation for its scanning efforts.
 D. Tying Arrangements
 Tying presents another antitrust concern.189 Adverse tying effects may result from 
this Settlement, even if the negotiating parties did not overtly intend such effects. As 
184. Id. §§ 4.5(b)(ii), 4.5(b)(v)(2).
185. Id. § 4.5(b)(v)(2).
186. See id.
187. Open Book Alliance Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 85, at 11; see also Amazon Objection, 
supra note 64, at 20 (“[T]he Resellers provision would not foster competition, but rather install “resellers” 
as weak sub-distributors of Google. Because only Google hosts the digital copies, Amazon would be 
effectively referring its customers to Google. . . . [This] creates incentives for customers to migrate to 
Google faster than they otherwise would.”). 
188. Open Book Alliance Memorandum, supra note 18, at 26–31.
189. “A tying arrangement exists when a seller of one product, A, requires its customers to purchase from it a 
second product, B, as well.” Blair & Kaserman, supra note 12, at 391.
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of March 2009, Google had a 63.7% percent market share of web searches.190 
However, Google’s market share in search is primarily due to Google’s superior 
ability to rank and retrieve pages effectively using PageRank, as well as its ability to 
integrate advertisements into its search results using unobtrusive text advertisements.191 
To the extent that Google earns market power based on such insights and innovation 
in the mass book digitization industry, Google should have some degree of leeway to 
establish such power. However, to the extent that the Settlement allows Google to 
tie Google Web Search to Google Book Search, Google will obtain a significant 
market advantage in the book search market that will allow Google to establish firm 
market control before any competitor even has an ability to establish itself as a viable 
alternative in that market.
 At first glance, a tying relationship between Google Web Search and Google 
Book Search may seem counterintuitive. The tying product (Google Web Search) is 
used at no direct monetary cost to consumer—thus, it is unclear how consumers are 
forced to pay for the tied product (Google Book Search) through the use of the tying 
product. In addition, it may not be entirely clear to consumers how Google Web 
Search is tied to Google Book Search. These ambiguities are quickly resolved, 
however. First, consumers do “pay” for the tying product each time they execute their 
searches on Google Web Search. Their payment takes the form of viewed 
advertisements that are displayed after each search. Absent Google’s large market 
share, advertisers would not pay Google to display their advertisements. With each 
search, consumers exercise the purchasing power that establishes this market share 
and determines the subsequent success of Google Web Search; and Google Book 
Search is tied to Google Web Search when Google Web Search includes results from 
books in its results pages. If consumers are drawn to search results that highlight 
book-purchasing options within Google Book Search, Google could further entrench 
its monopoly power over the purchase of digitized books.192 The groundwork is already 
being laid—as Dan Clancy, engineering director for Google Book Search, has stated, 
“[e]very time you search Google [Web Search], you’re searching twelve million 
books.”193 Although Google uses its search algorithm, it preferences its own properties 
190. Google Widens Lead in U.S. Searches: comScore, Reuters, (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/
article/technologyNews/idUSTRE53E6YT20090415.
191. PageRank is a proprietary Google technology that ranks pages according to their relative importance. 
See Corporate Information–Technology Overview, Google, http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
192. In fact, if you type Black Beauty into Google Web Search, the Google Book Search result for the Anna 
Sewell classic is the fifth link. Because this is a public domain work copyrighted in the United States in 
1895, its inclusion in the Google Web Search results is not anti-competitive, in-copyright books can be 
located using Web Search as well. Anna Sewell, Black Beauty (Double Day Page 1922) (1895). 
Project Gutenberg (the Open Content Alliance) indicates that this book is in the public domain in the 
United States. Black Beauty by Anna Sewell, Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/271 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
193. Google’s Goal: Digitize Every Book Ever Printed, PBS Newshour (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/entertainment/july-dec09/google_12-30.html. Both the transcript and a video of the 
original broadcast are available on the above website.
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in search results and has admitted that it “changes the rank ordering of paid search 
ads to prioritize company messages it wishes to convey.”194 Thus, it is possible that 
books in GBS will be ranked higher than a competitor’s digitized book offerings.
 The Settlement is unlikely to constitute a per se tying violation under current 
antitrust law. This is because, in general, the plaintiff must prove that there is a sale 
or agreement to sell one product or service conditioned on the purchase of another to 
establish a per se violation.195 Because there is no explicit purchase of Google Web 
Search by potential consumers of Google Book Search, this case is unlikely to fall 
under the traditional per se rule. In addition, the per se rule is usually not applied to 
cases involving technological integration with demonstrable efficiencies, or to 
products and markets “where there are arguably benefits from tying and the industry 
is one in which the economics and technology have not been thoroughly examined 
by the courts.”196 Due to the relative novelty of this industry and the associated 
technology, courts (and the DOJ) are likely to pursue a rule of reason inquiry.197
 Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that there is a tying violation under the 
rule of reason. The court stated in Microsoft:
The core concern is that tying prevents goods from competing directly for 
consumer choice on their merits, i.e., being selected as a result of “buyers’ 
independent judgment.” With a tie, a buyer’s “freedom to select the best 
bargain in the second market [could be] impaired by his need to purchase the 
tying product, and perhaps by an inability to evaluate the true cost of either 
product . . . .”198
This need to purchase the tying product manifests in our constant use of Google 
Web Search. If consumers are drawn to purchasing digital copies of books as a 
primary result of their propensity to perform searches on Google Web Search, is 
Google legitimately earning market share? More importantly, are customers gaining 
a legitimate opportunity to compare Google’s consumer purchase offerings with 
other book digitizers’ offerings? It is important that we scrutinize the extent to which 
the Settlement allows Google to establish a superior market position over individual 
consumer purchases based solely on Google Book Search’s connection to Google 
Web Search.
 Under the terms of the Settlement, there is room for Google to promote anti-
competitive behavior through a tying arrangement between Google Book Search 
and Google Web Search. In a section that otherwise restricts Google’s ability to 
provide hyperlinks to Google Book Search preview pages from some of its products, 
194. Open Book Alliance Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 85, at 20.
195. See Handbook, supra note 92, at 192.
196. Id. at 194–95.
197. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (“While every ‘business relationship’ will in some sense have unique features, some represent 
entire, novel categories of dealings. . . . There being no close parallel in prior antitrust cases, simplistic 
application of per se tying rules carries a serious risk of harm.”). 
198. Id. at 87 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13–15 (1984)).
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Google is not restricted to provide hyperlinks to the GBS pages from its search services 
(including Google Web Search and Google Earth).199 Moreover, Google can provide 
links to Google Book Search pages when its services “have the effect of making 
discovery of Books easier, more efficient, more widespread or more useful.”200 This 
latter clause is particularly broad and may provide Google with a court-sanctioned 
justification for virtually any tying arrangement under the guise of efficiency. Most 
may agree that it is acceptable for a public domain work such as Black Beauty to come 
up in Google Web Search results.201 However, should in-copyright, revenue-
generating books be included in search results as well? On the one hand, inclusion of 
these works in search results would promote accessibility and improve efficiency in 
locating books. On the other hand, such inclusion could hinder competition with 
other book digitizers.
 This leads to the key question. If Google is allowed to tie its Google Web Search 
functionality to Google Book Search, how will it react when other competitors enter 
the market? The search for Black Beauty currently yields results from other book 
digitizers such as Project Gutenberg and the Open Content Alliance, as those are 
other digitizers who have focused on public domain works. However, if Amazon 
were to begin digitizing its own books and attempted to sell them, would Google 
Web Search results return links to their books when you search for a book title?202 If 
not, Google could be seen as exhibiting deliberate behavior that would represent an 
attempt to monopolize the market. It would be saying to consumers, “[i]f you use 
Google Web Search, we are going to make it very easy for you to buy a digital book 
from us, but, we are not going to let you know that there are digital books being 
offered by others.”203
 Two basic proposals could minimize the anti-competitive effects of tying on the 
Settlement. First, Google should not be allowed to integrate Google Book Search 
functionality into Google Web Search by default under the Settlement. If such 
integrated functionality were allowed, consumers should at least be required to 
explicitly opt-in to any Google Book Search functionality within Google Web 
Search. A default rule of separation such as this will allow different digital book 
options to compete on their merits, and the opt-in opportunity would still allow 
Google to efficiently integrate its products as it desires. Second, Google should not 
be able to exploit its current market position in web searching to entrench a 
199. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, § 3.10(b). 
200. Id.
201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. It is a non-revenue-generating public domain work. 
202. This, of course, assumes that we are searching for book titles, and not within the full text of books. 
Google should not be expected (as a default rule) to search the full text of Amazon’s digitized books 
unless Amazon is willing to provide a full-text copy of its books to Google. 
203. Another sub-issue of this is whether Google will allow competitors to submit their texts to Google to be 
searchable. Some digitized books that will be purchased may not be found as a result of title searches. 
Rather, someone may search for a topic of interest on Google and see a book of interest that is returned 
based on Google’s search of the scanned text of the book. If Google refuses to search the scanned texts 
of competitors’ books, this could be another potentially anti-competitive practice.
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monopolistic market in book searching. An alternative option would be to allow 
Google to include links to Google Book Search pages from Google Web Search 
queries, but to also ensure that other competitors’ digitized books are well-represented 
and displayed adjacent to all Google Book Search results.204
V. OthEr COnsidEratiOns: is thE sEttLEMEnt rEasOnabLE?
 The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that many anti-competitive outcomes 
could arise after approval of the Settlement. It ultimately is the responsibility of the 
DOJ to investigate a licensing arrangement if it determines that the licensing 
arrangement is likely to promote anti-competitive outcomes—presumably this is why 
the DOJ began an inquiry into the Settlement and filed a statement expressing some 
initial concerns. However, even if a licensing arrangement is perceived to restrain 
competition, the agency will conduct an investigation to determine whether or not 
the restraints are “reasonably necessary” to achieve pro-competitive efficiencies—
thus, we are not clear what the final verdict from the DOJ will be in this matter.205 
As the expected anti-competitive effects of a particular licensing arrangement (or, in 
this case, the Settlement) increase, the DOJ is less likely to defer to that arrangement 
unless a correspondingly high level of competitive efficiency can be expected as 
well.206 This Part provides a general discussion about whether or not the restraints 
imposed by the current Settlement are “reasonably necessary” based on doctrinal 
principles and an analysis of the tradeoffs between the Settlement’s anti-competitive 
effects and its efficiencies.
 A. Antitrust Safety Zone
 As a baseline test to determine the reasonableness of a particular settlement, the 
DOJ has established an “antitrust safety zone.”207 Settlements or licensing 
arrangements that fall within this zone are unlikely to have significant anti-
competitive effects that outweigh the efficiency gains of the arrangements, and so 
the agencies would not use their valuable resources to challenge those arrangements. 
According to the Guidelines, two criteria must be met for a settlement to fall within 
the safety zone. First, a restraint must not be facially anti-competitive. Activities that 
are facially anti-competitive are those that warrant per se antitrust scrutiny such as 
naked price-fixing, output restraints, and market divisions among horizontal 
competitors. Second, the licensor and its licensees may collectively account for no 
more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the 
204. Examples include digitized books from the Open Content Alliance’s Internet Archive, Amazon, and 
others. Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010); Open Content 
Alliance, http://www.opencontentalliance.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010); Amazon, http://www.
amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/home/home.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
205. See Guidelines, supra note 69, § 4.2.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 22.
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restraint. 208 It is unlikely that the DOJ would consider the Settlement to be facially 
anti-competitive based on the analyses that have been applied above. Although many 
of the Settlement’s provisions can foster anti-competitive outcomes—including some 
price-fixing that borders on per se illegality—most of the antitrust risks are likely to 
be scrutinized under the rule of reason.
 Under the second condition, however, the Settlement falls far outside the safety 
zone. Google, the Authors, and the Publishers, bound by the Settlement collectively, 
account for far more than twenty percent of the relevant market impacted by the 
restraint. Google, to date, has digitized tens of millions of books.209 All books that 
were digitized by Google prior to January 5, 2009 are bound under the Settlement, 
with the exception of those few authors who voluntary chose to opt out.210 Given that, 
on average, only 0.6% of those individuals bound by a settlement choose to opt out, 
we can assume for all intents and purposes that most of the tens of millions of books 
that have been scanned will be covered by the Settlement.211 Meanwhile, Google has 
dwarfed its current competitors in the book digitization market. Besides Google, only 
the not-for-profit Open Content Alliance’s Internet Archive has reached the two 
million-book threshold, which places it in a distant second place.212 This should raise 
a red flag to the DOJ both before and after the Settlement’s approval.
 B. Moving Towards an Antitrust Regime that Protects Individual Consumers
 In gauging the reasonability of the Settlement Agreement, the DOJ should also 
consider the long-term public interest goals of accessibility, innovation, and public 
transparency that have been introduced in this article. These goals are all meant to 
protect the individual consumer who, in the absence of intervention, may be shut out 
from the discussions that will shape the final incarnation of the Settlement. Each of 
these public interest goals is promoted by the Settlement to some degree. Insofar as 
Google is expanding access to millions of books, Google is providing an unambiguous 
public access benefit. GBS, meanwhile, is innovative. Never before have books been 
so widely digitized and searchable at the same time. In some respects, Google has 
been remarkably transparent about the Settlement by maintaining blog postings and 
sending its representatives to panels and public forums. However, this transparency 
was not present during settlement negotiations to the extent that Google may have 
acted by willful misdirection.213
208. Id.
209. See DOJ ASA Statement, supra note 83, at 21.
210. See Google Settlement Notice, supra note 74.
211. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1541–43 (2004).
212. See supra note 45. As of October 14, 2010, the Internet Archive’s website shows that 2,523,580 digitized 
texts are available. Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
213. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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 However, these public goals will be negatively impacted by the Settlement as well. 
The Settlement hinders accessibility by opening the door to a potentially rigid pricing 
scheme and creating barriers to entry for future competitors; it fails to fully address 
the needs of libraries, public schools, and other institutions that should have the 
opportunity to receive broad access; and remote access appears to be limited. Innovation 
is hindered by barriers to entry created by its failure to proactively reduce collective 
action problems faced by third parties who may want to broker deals with a registry 
and anti-competitive tying between Google Web Search and Google Book Search. 
Despite Google’s relative degree of public transparency, many of the Settlement’s 
provisions are highly ambiguous, which has left many in the dark as they have 
attempted to discuss the merits of the Settlement.214 Because the Settlement provides 
no formal mechanisms for public accountability, the public will have minimal ability 
to express its will through the market, absent competition, once it is approved.
 Recent case law suggests that the focus of antitrust law has shifted to protect the 
individual consumer, even when such protections may seem to decrease efficiency 
somewhat.215 Thus, even if Google, the Authors, and the Publishers champion the 
efficiency gains from the Settlement, the DOJ should still be mindful of the 
Settlement’s overall impact on individual consumers. Professors Kirkwood and 
Lande, for example, cite the Brooke Group case, which indicated that “consumer 
welfare” was equated with the benefits the consumers received in the relevant 
market.216 Moreover, opinions have tended to focus on consumer impact rather than 
overall efficiency,217 and “whenever the courts have addressed an actual or potential 
conflict between consumer well-being and efficiency, consumer interests have always 
prevailed.”218 Thus, while overall economic efficiency concerns are important—and 
could be construed as a “major antitrust desideratum”219—the interests of the 
individual consumer should be weighed heavily when examining antitrust issues that 
may fall under the rule of reason.220 I contend that the three public interest principles 
I present are in line with the interests of most, if not all, individual consumers.
214. I am not the first one who has called for the settlement agreement to be clarified. Professor Picker 
devotes an entire subsection of his paper to this concern. See Picker, supra note 17, at 21. 
215. From an economic perspective, one could argue that a settlement that promotes broad access to 
knowledge amongst all consumers is more Pareto efficient, while a settlement that merely maximizes 
overall access to knowledge would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, however, is only 
optimal if redistribution of efficient outcomes amongst consumers is possible.
216. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Chicago School ’s Foundation is Flawed: Antitrust Protects 
Consumers, Not Efficiency, in How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark 89, 94 (Robert 
Pitofsky ed., 2008).
217. Id. 
218. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 216, at 94 (emphasis added).
219. Goetz & McChesney, supra note 125, at 11. 
220. Id. at 11–12.
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 On a related note, I question the assumptions of some leading antitrust economists 
who have argued that the Settlement is pro-competitive.221 In general, they argue 
that, because the Settlement increases output in the digital book market, it produces 
net efficiency gains that warrant its approval.222 Following Robert Bork’s philosophy, 
these economists uphold the theory that, “unless the conduct or industry structure 
limits output, it does not harm consumers.”223 A central tenet of Professor Elhauge’s 
analysis, for example, is what he calls the “but-for baseline.” But for the Settlement, 
the argument goes, we would have “a world where no firm offers either unclaimed 
books or a comprehensive set of out-of-print books.”224 So, on the margin, the 
Settlement enhances competition in relation to a world without a settlement—thus, 
there may be some net efficiency, and to these scholars, the inquiry ends there.
 There are multiple problems with this argument. First, it illustrates the shift to 
pure efficiency considerations to the exclusion of broader considerations of individual 
consumer welfare in antitrust analyses. Rather than focus on the efficiency of the 
post-settlement world in relation to a world with no settlement, the inquiry should 
begin with the post-settlement world and, mindful of its anti-competitive constraints, 
it should consider whether or not alterations to the Settlement could promote 
competition and enhance consumer welfare in relation to the world that is established 
immediately after the Settlement is approved. The question should not be whether 
competition is enhanced at all by the Settlement, but whether competition is enhanced 
enough by it. Put another way—while the Settlement may increase output relative to 
a pre-settlement world, can we imagine a world with even more output if the Settlement 
were approved in a different form? Context may be relevant to this inquiry too, which 
is why I have strongly emphasized the unique competitive landscape of the market 
for fully searchable, digitized books. Broader, long-term assessments of anti-
competitive effects necessarily removes antitrust analysis from a more rule-bound, 
predictable, regime,225 but such analyses—such as the DOJ inquiry—are normatively 
desirable. Unlike the narrow inquiry conducted by Professor Elhauge and others 
based on marginal book output, broader inquiries are within the spirit of the rule of 
reason because such inquiries may enable analysts to better gauge the effects—both 
short-term and long-term—of a particular restraint.226 And, as the Open Book 
Alliance keenly noted in its filing, “[t]he Court will note the dearth of citations in 
221. Professors’ Brief, supra note 138, at 1.
222. See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 3; see also Professors’ Brief, supra note 138, at 1. 
223. Reback, supra note 90, at 30.
224. Elhauge, supra note 7, at 14 (emphasis in original).
225. See, e.g., Reback, supra note 90, at 30–31 (“Bork claimed that evaluating the trade-off between the 
economic loss of reduced competition and the benefit of greater competitive efficiency f lowing from a 
merger or business practice in any given lawsuit is not only well beyond the competence of judges, but is 
simply impossible for anyone, even the most talented economist.”).
226. See, e.g., National Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding that the 
purpose of antitrust analysis under the rule of reason is to “form a judgment about the competitive 
significance of the restraint . . . .”).
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the brief to the case law supporting a criterion [of increased book output]. A rule of 
reason evaluation does not turn solely on increasing output; if it did, every joint 
venture for the creation of product would pass antitrust scrutiny.”227
 Finally, even assuming that the inquiry should solely turn on output, Settlement 
supporters make a bold assertion when they assume that a complex settlement such 
as this one will undoubtedly increase output along all sectors of the book industry. 
We should acknowledge the reasonable possibility that this Settlement leaves room 
for more output restrictions than may be desirable in the long-term, and the DOJ’s 
continued oversight of the Settlement that I advocate would allow it to take remedial 
action when necessary.
 C. Historic Court Deference to Copyright Settlements
 Even if a DOJ or court inquiry were broader than the inquiry advocated by the 
Settlement’s proponents, however, courts generally defer to copyright settlements 
once they are agreed to. In the absence of apparent ulterior motives on the part of 
settling parties, for example, at least one court has refused to delve deeply into the 
potential antitrust concerns of settlements.228 In addition, absent ethical and deceptive 
practices on their part, the Noerr Pennington doctrine could have provided Google, 
the Authors, and the Publishers with immunity from antitrust liability if the 
Settlement is later found to be anti-competitive.229 However, the parties have agreed 
to waive their claims to Noerr Pennington immunity.230 It would, however, be 
inefficient to pursue additional rounds of litigation if that option were avoidable. 
This is another reason why it is crucial that the DOJ, and other entities, should be 
proactive rather than reactive in addressing the antitrust concerns addressed in this 
article. Nevertheless, in view of the Settlement’s likely approval, and Google’s waiver 
227. Open Book Alliance Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 85, at 12.
228. See Hutzler Bros. v. Sales Affiliates, 164 F.2d 260, 267 (D. Md. 1947) (holding that “[w]e cannot 
attach . . . any ulterior motives, or any improper conduct, to plaintiffs in connection with the agreed 
settlement . . . .”).
229. See Handbook, supra note 92, at 271. The Noerr Pennington doctrine provides antitrust immunity to 
parties who advocate for the passage of laws or settlements, even if they are later found to be anti-
competitive. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135–39 
(1961). 
230. Attachment L to Amended Settlement Agreement at 6, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 
05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended_
settlement/SettlementAttachments/Attachment-L-Proposed-Final-Judgment-and-Order-of-Dismissal.
pdf.
[T]he Court hereby reserves jurisdiction over the subject matter and as to each party to 
the Amended Settlement Agreement with respect to the interpretation and 
implementation of the Amended Settlement Agreement for all purposes, including 
enforcement of any of the terms thereof at the instance of any party and resolution of 
any disputes that may arise relating in any way to, or arising from, the implementation 
of the Amended Settlement Agreement or the implementation of this Order.
 Id. 
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of Noerr Pennington immunity, the DOJ should consider litigation in the future if 
necessary as it continues to oversee the Settlement’s implementation.
 Admittedly, one of the reasons that parties often enter into settlements is because 
the terms of the settlement may be more favorable to the parties than the outcome of 
litigation. Jeff Cunard, one of the lawyers representing the Publishers in the case, 
confirmed this sentiment.231 By settling, the parties involved chose to obtain a middle 
ground solution out of an interest of avoiding long and protracted litigation. Google 
was likely seeking expedient approval of its scanning activities so that it could 
continue its operations, while the risk-averse publishers probably wanted to avoid a 
successful fair-use claim by Google. Full litigation of this case would have probably 
taken several years, thereby further delaying public access to digitized books. Thus, 
there are some advantages to the Settlement.
 Ultimately, however, the best interests of the parties are not necessarily the best 
interests of the consumer. This is why, when discussing patent settlements, Professor 
Carl Shapiro advises that the antitrust law should be used to prevent settlements that 
lead to lower expected consumer surplus than would arise from ongoing litigation.232 
Particularly in a case of this magnitude, analysis of the viability of the Settlement 
should be particularly dependent on the public interest. This settlement is about 
much more than the interests of Google, the Authors, and the Publishers and about 
sheer efficiency considerations. It is about all of us.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 Ironically, co-founder of Google, Sergey Brin, recently called critics of the Google 
Book Search Settlement “shortsighted.”233 From his perspective, such a statement may 
make sense. If I spent two years trying to hammer out a settlement agreement that 
would allow millions of people to access digital books, I may be frustrated by critics 
too. As drafted, the Settlement admittedly confers substantial benefits on the public.
 For Mr. Brin to assume that the Settlement is adequate as constructed, however, 
is shortsighted in and of itself. Looking out towards the horizon, other critics and I 
see the possibility of something better. This article has identified several anti-
competitive risks in the Settlement that may adversely affect competition in the 
market for fully searchable, digitized books. These anti-competitive loopholes pose 
legal risks to both Google and the Registry. By allowing these loopholes to stand 
without continued scrutiny, the Settlement could compromise normative goals of 
book accessibility, innovation in the book digitization market, and accountability to 
the public. Knowing that the future of books will almost certainly take a digital form, 
231. Jeff Cunard, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Library 2.0 Conference at Yale University, Panel 4, 
Part 1: Digitizing Collections (Apr. 4, 2009), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9C8ZZep
FI2U&feature=PlayList&p=08C1B3123A2AE6DB&index=2.
232. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 Rand J. Econ. 391, 395–98 (2003).
233. Cade Metz, Google Brands Ebook Monopoly Critics ‘Shortsighted’, The Register, May 21, 2009, http://
www.theregister.co.uk/2009/05/21/brin_defends_book_settlment/page2.html. See also Picker, supra 
note 17 (suggesting a “no Noerr” clause in the settlement). 
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these are not goals that should be taken lightly. This is why the DOJ needs to exercise 
continued oversight over the Settlement to ensure that it is implemented in a manner 
that promotes broad access to knowledge, competition, and innovation in this 
emerging market. If the DOJ and the parties to the Settlement truly care about access 
to knowledge and a long-term pro-competitive outcome, I would expect no less.
